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1. Introduction 
This working paper explores reinsertion and reintegration processes and how these connect 
(or are expected to connect) with donor-led strategies for post-conflict reconstruction and 
long-term development. DDR has long been recognised as essential for post-conflict stability, 
but in the 2000s, there has been emphasis on enhancing the linkages between short-term, 
time-bound DDR process and long-term reconstruction and development programmes and 
processes in post-conflict states.1 The importance of situating reintegration into the wider 
context of long-term development has been stressed by the UN, whose best practice 
guidelines emphasise that reintegration should: ‘support a broader national strategic plan for 
reconciliation, reconstruction and development.’2 This does not suggest a restructuring of 
DDR activities, which aim to establish an environment conducive to long-term economic 
development rather than fostering long-term development,3 but a bridging of short- and long-
term agendas. 
 
Strategies for promoting long-term development in post-conflict states have, like DDR best 
practice, evolved over the last decade. Donors and international financial institutions (IFIs) 
have sought to improve strategies for promoting economic development in post-conflict and 
fragile state contexts, a move toward anticipating and organizing post-conflict development 
and state building programmes that was first outlined by the World Bank in 1995.4 This has 
increased awareness of mechanisms and opportunities for linkage between short- and long-
term processes, and the need for holistic approaches. The utility of enhancing connections has 
been further underscored by the concentration of DDR activities in poor countries and 
understanding of the ‘conflict trap’, wherein poverty and exclusion are identified as drivers of 
conflict.5 At the institutional level, the synergy between DDR and development agencies, and 
                                                 
1  UNDP (2005) Practice Note on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-combatants.  
http://www.undp.org/cpr/documents/ddr/_DDR_Practice_Note_English_PDF.pdf. 
2  Report by the UN Secretary-General (February 2000) The Role of United Nations Peacekeeping in 
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. 
3 L. Specker (2007) Reintegration Phase of DDR Processes. Expert meeting report. Netherlands Institute of 
International Relations ‘Clingendael’, Conflict Research Unit.  
http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2008/20080128_cru_conf_ddr-r-phase.pdf 
4 N. Colletta (1995) “From Warriors to Workers: The World Bank’s Role in Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” 
Leaders, No. 204;  The World Bank (1997) Framework for World Bank Involvement in Post-Conflict  
Reconstruction. World Bank: Washington, D.C. 
5 D. Collier et al, (2003), Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy, World Bank Policy 
Research Report No. 26121. World Bank: Washington, D.C.; D. Collier (2004), ‘Development and Conflict’, 
Centre for the Study of African Economies, Department of Economics, Oxford University. Mimeograph; D. 
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the capacity for connected programming, has been promoted through new specialised units 
such as the UN’s Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR6and the World Bank’s Conflict 
Prevention and Reconstruction (CPR) Unit.  
1.1 Findings of the paper 
This paper argues that despite the intentions of the international and donor community, there 
is a long way to go before DDR activities and long-term development strategies can merge 
seamlessly in the manner envisaged. Even though there has been convergence between DDR 
and development programmes and processes in best practice guidelines, practical experience 
of connectivity is limited and research and thinking around linkages is at a rudimentary stage. 
There has been very little follow-though in terms of serious planning and application of 
connected programming strategies. Much work needs to be done to identify and elaborate 
linkages between DDR and long-term development if such linkages are shown to be 
appropriate, while tools that could be of value in connecting these programming areas, such 
as needs assessments, require technical refinement before they can be of practical and 
operational utility. More fundamentally, as ‘stand alone’ programme areas, DDR and post-
conflict reconstruction processes face significant operational, logistical and financial 
constraints. Unless these policy and process challenges are addressed, advances in building 
linkages between DDR and long-term development will be of limited and questionable value. 
It is also evident that linkages between DDR and long-term development will be problematic 
to forge owing to practical institutional constraints. There is little cross-over by practitioners 
and specialists from DDR and development programming and this is reflected in a broader 
conceptual, policy and specialist division: DDR continues to be written, approached and 
appraised through a military and security lens, while development theory, policy and strategy 
continues to be written by economists and informed by political economy / economics 
disciplinary approaches.  
 
Beyond the ‘micro’ challenges faced by linked programming strategies, this paper points to 
two macro-level questions that need to be addressed. Current reconstruction and development 
strategies have been shown to provide an inadequate stake in peace for a broad sector of the 
population, while undermining prospects for successful and sustainable reintegration. Might 
current market-led donor approaches to economic stabilisation and post conflict 
reconstruction contradict reintegration activities by generating new patterns of political and 
economic exclusion that can in turn catalyse new conflicts? Rather than embedding 
reintegration into current strategic approaches to development, should the development 
paradigm itself be re-assessed? Secondly, what is the instrumental value of reintegration? 
Here it is important to stress that there is no consensus on the scope of DDR within the policy, 
                                                                                                                                                        
Collier and A. Hoeffler (2005), ‘Resource Rents, Governance and Conflict’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 
49, no.4.  
6  In line with UN General Assembly Resolution 59/296 that stressed the importance of: ‘strengthened 
cooperation and coordination between the various actors within and outside the United Nations system to ensure 
both the effective use of resources and coherence on the ground in implementing disarmament, demobilisation 
and reintegration programmes.’ For background discussion, see Expert Seminar (July 2006) EU and DDR: 
Supporting Security and Development, Brussels,  
http://www.conflictprevention.net/library/documents/thematic_issues/eu_and_ddr_seminar_report.pdf. 
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practitioner and academic community. In order that the debate on linkages can progress, there 
needs to be detailed exploration of the benefits of separating reintegration out from 
disarmament and demobilisation and simply limiting DDR programming to the more ‘hard’ 
security oriented D and D. Should then the policy and practitioner community return to first 
principles and focus on separating out, improving and effectively resourcing short- and long-
term processes rather than seeking to bridge them?7  
 
1.2 Methodological Challenges 
This paper draws upon a desk study of the key primary source documentation in the fields of 
DDR and development. It incorporates evidence from the field work and papers conducted 
for this project, primary source policy and programme documents and secondary source 
academic material. Exploring the relationship between DDR and long-term development is 
problematic on a number of counts. Firstly, the donor community has only recently moved to 
integrate DDR and connect programmes to long-term development strategies. Thinking 
around linkages is underdeveloped, abstract and largely restricted to ‘specialised’ post-
conflict reconstruction units. The material available for review and analysis is therefore 
limited. Secondly, the majority of the 34 global DDR experiences have been conducted 
relatively recently and as a result, the timeframe for assessing longer-term impacts and 
linkages is too narrow to provide substantive empirical insights.8 Thirdly, there has been little 
to no tracking of those targeted for reinsertion and reintegration activities. Consequently there 
is limited empirical material from which substantive conclusions as to the connectivity (or 
otherwise) of DDR and long-term development can be drawn out. Underscoring a generalised 
paucity of empirical data, there is also a lack of research into programme initiatives intended 
to enhance connectivity such as ‘Community Driven Development’. Where insights and 
‘lessons learned’ have been gathered, this has been at an early stage of the conflict to peace 
transition and from small-scale surveys. Moreover judging ‘success’ in reintegration is 
problematic. Unlike the D and D elements, which can be assessed from quantitative 
information, there is no standard methodology for evaluating the R component. And while 
reintegration may be evaluated as successful from a ‘macro perspective’ if there is no 
recurrence of conflict (i.e. a process-oriented assessment), ‘micro-level’ performance oriented 
assessments, based on indicators such as community security, ex-combatant employment and 
civic engagement (of which there are very few) can provide different indicators of 
reintegration. Finally, this paper is being written during a period of changing paradigms and 
perceptions of best practice. As such, DDR and long-term development strategies constitute 
something of a ‘moving target’ in terms of analysis.      
 
1.3 Structure of the paper 
This paper is divided into 2 main sections: the first section looking at best practice in (short-
term) reintegration and (long term) development strategy in conflict-prone country contexts, 
                                                 
7 N. Ball and L. van der Goor (2006) Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Mapping issues, 
Dilemmas and Guiding Principles, Clingendael, Conflict Research Unit. 
8 The International Labour Organization (ILO) has determined that 10 years is necessary in order to conduct a 
valid study of reintegration impact. 
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the second looking at existing limitations to effective linkage between these two processes. In 
order to address the opportunities and constraints for linking DDR and long term 
development, the paper seeks to unpack the key issues by firstly discussing best practice in 
reintegration strategies (section 2). The aim here is to consider current best practice 
guidelines for reinsertion and reintegration, situating these processes within current thinking 
on integrated and connected post-conflict development programming. The focus specifically 
on the issue of reintegration is not intended to sideline the significance of demobilisation, 
disarmament and related security issues for long-term development processes but to enable 
specific consideration of the reintegration phase, as this is upheld as the nodal point for 
linkage between short- and long-term processes.  
 
Section 3 turns away from DDR debates and focuses on the long-term development angle. It 
explores current international and donor agency best practice in development strategy for 
conflict prone and post-conflict countries. The section discusses recent initiatives that are 
intended to break the ‘conflict trap’ and generate pro-poor economic growth, stability and 
long-term development. The section identifies those tools and mechanisms (such as Needs 
Assessment Frameworks and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers) that can be used as vehicles 
to connect short- and long-term processes. In order to substantiate the claim that there are 
ongoing and significant constraints to reintegration programming that have to be overcome 
before progress can be made in enhancing linkages to long-term processes, Section 4 returns 
to the issue of reintegration and overviews the problems experienced in recent DDR 
experiences. The aim here is to highlight areas of weakness in programming and to outline 
the limitations that these impose on efforts to forge connectivity with long-term development 
programmes and processes. The fifth, final section looks at technical and programming 
constraints in long-term development planning and considers the contradictions implicit in 
peace-building projects that seek to connect reintegration to market led development and 
economic stabilisation strategies.   
 
2.  Best Practice in Reintegration  
The ‘R’ component (rehabilitation, reinsertion, reintegration and resettlement) has become a 
key aspect of the UN’s broader post-conflict development agenda, where it is defined as: 
‘essentially a social and economic process with an open timeframe [. . .] part of the general 
development of a country.’9 Reintegration programmes are conceptualised as the connecting 
point between DDR and national development plans. Effective reintegration programmes can 
enable ex-combatants to contribute to post-conflict reconstruction; enhance productive 
capacity and restore livelihoods; contribute to development and economic growth through the 
provision of training and labour; and contribute to security and prospects for peace by 
deconstructing military modes of behaviour and building civic awareness, citizenship and the 
promotion of non-violent forms of dispute resolution. 10  For these reasons, best practice 
                                                 
9 UN (2006) Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) 1.2 Introduction to 
Integrated DDR Standards. http://www.unddr.org/iddrs/01/ 
10 IDDRS, 2.20 Post-conflict Stabilization, Peace-building and Recovery Frameworks. 
http://www.unddr.org/iddrs/02/20.php 
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guidelines stress that reintegration processes should be embedded in a comprehensive 
framework for peace consolidation and economic recovery.  
 
2.1 The Importance of Reintegration 
While reinsertion is a short-term, transitional exercise 11  that focuses on the immediate 
provision of assistance such as clothes, medical assistance, tools, shelter, money or food to 
demobilised ex-combatants, 12  reintegration is a multidimensional: ‘complex, long-term 
process through which ex-combatants and their dependents are assisted to (re)settle in post 
war communities (the social element), become part of the decision-making process (the 
political element), engage in sustainable civilian employment and livelihoods (the economic 
aspect), as well as adjust to attitudes and expectations and/or deal with their war-related 
mental trauma.’13  
 
Reintegration activities are valued as a good in their own right, (benefiting the ex-combatant 
and his or her dependents) and the wider community by facilitating prospects for peace and 
development.14 This can be seen on four levels.15 Firstly, reintegration serves as a form of 
humanitarian assistance in which all war-affected actors and constituencies - including ex-
combatants – are recognised as victims; it is also a form of ‘compensatory justice’16 where: 
‘ex-soldiers believe they have done their duty, either as defenders of the state or members of 
liberation forces and they expect their contribution to be officially recognised.’ Thirdly, 
reintegration allows ex-combatants to bring essential skills, ‘manpower’ and social capital to 
the recovery and reconstruction process.17 Finally – and linking with the benefits to the wider 
community, reintegration can prevent a return to conflict by addressing potential security 
threats. Employment and job training for reintegration for example reduce dependence on 
factional networks that link ex-combatants and the potential for ‘spoiler’ activity, by 
providing material incentives to ‘buy in’ to peace processes. This reduces the risk that ex-
combatants will seek to secure unmet material need (and those of dependents) through 
criminal activity and violence– or engage in new forms of violence, such as domestic 
violence generated by feelings of frustration and perceptions of powerlessness. Countering 
the security risk posed by ‘idle’ ex-combatants is a pre-requisite for economic development, 
                                                 
11 N. Ball and L. van de Goor (2006) ibid.  
12 S. Willibald (2006) ‘Does money work? Cash transfers to ex-combatants in disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration processes’, Disasters, vol. 30, issue 3.  
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.0361-3666.2005.00323.x 
13 G. Dzinesa (2007) ‘Postconflict Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Former Combatants in 
Southern Africa’, International Studies Perspective, vol. 8; K. Kingma (2002) ‘Demobilization, Reintegration 
and Peacebuilding in Africa’, International Peacekeeping, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 99-132. 
14 N. Hitchcock (2004) ‘Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: The Case of Angola’, Conflict Trends, 
vol. 1, pp. 36-40. 
15 A. Heinemann-Gruder and T. Pietz (2003) Turning Soldiers into a Workforce: Demobilisation and 
Reintegration in Post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bonn: BICC; K. Kingma (2000) (ed.) Demobilization in 
sub-Saharan Africa: The Development and Security Impacts. Houndmills: Macmillan. 
16 J. Schafer (1998) “A Baby Who Does Not Cry Will Not Be Suckled”: AMODEG and the Reintegration of 
Demobilised Soldiers’, Journal of Southern African Studies, vol. 24, no. 1. 
17 S. Klingebiel et al (1995) (eds) Promoting the Reintegration of Former Female and Male Combatants in 
Eritrea: Possible Contributions of Development Co-operation to the Reintegration Programme. Bonn: DIE. 
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with the implications of ‘post-conflict’ violence outlined in the UNDP review of ex-
combatant reintegration in the Central Africa Republic: 
 
These multiple forms of insecurity translate into muggings, armed robbery, rapes, 
widespread looting, and hostage taking with ransom demands […] The most palpable 
consequence of this high level of insecurity is the inability of CAR authorities to 
effectively launch and implement their emergency socio-economic recovery programs, 
especially in the rural areas.18 
 
Linked to the economic and material aspects of reintegration is the need for effective social 
and political reintegration. Ex-combatant participation in civic and community life is viewed 
as essential for peace and stability in the post-conflict period.19 The political reintegration 
process recasts ex-combatants as citizens allowing for the substitution of old ‘identities and 
emblems’ premised on and shaped by violence and conflict, with new social and cultural 
identities and interests. Effective political reintegration provides mechanisms through which 
ex-combatants can participate in defining the new post-conflict social contract and articulate 
their grievances and demands through pacific channels. This in turn assists in re-legitimising 
institutions and government and the construction of a political culture based on non-violent 
resolution of conflict and difference. The failure to adequately reintegrate ex-combatants both 
in economic and political terms has had deleterious consequences for stability in a number of 
country cases that include El Salvador, Nicaragua, East Timor, Namibia and Zimbabwe.20 
The lesson learned from these experiences is that political marginalisation, alienation, unmet 
need and uncompensated reward can be channelled through destabilising protest actions and 
the emergence of disaffected veteran’s movements which can play: ‘an important role in 
destabilizing the social order and polarising the political debate, becoming easy targets of 
populist, reactionary, and extremist movements.’21   
 
2.2 Programme design  
Best practice in reintegration programme design, as outlined in the SIDDR22 and IDDRS 
stresses that programmes should be responsive to, and informed by a detailed understanding 
                                                 
18 See for example UNDP (Feb 2004) Ex-Combatants Reintegration and Community Support Project (ERCS) 
Central African Republic. LAC reviewed document; Oxfam 2005 
19 J. Gomes Porto, I. Parsons and C. Alden (2007) From Soldiers to Citizens: The Social, Economic and 
Political Reintegration of Unita Ex-Combatants. Ashgate: Basingstoke. Also available 
at http://www.iss.co.za/dynamic/administration/file_manager/file_links/MONO130FULL.PDF?link_id=25&slin
k_ 
id=4339&link_type=12&slink_type=13&tmpl_id=3 
20 S. Gear (2002) ‘Wishing us Away: Challenges Facing ex-Combatants in the ‘New’ South Africa’, Centre for 
the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, Violence and Transition Series, Vol. 8. 
21 M. Fusato (2003) ‘Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants’, in G. Burgess and H. 
Burgess (eds.) Beyond Intractability, Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, 
Boulder. http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/demobilization/. For a detailed case study of this danger 
using the example of Zimbabwe, see M. Musemwa (1995) ‘The Ambiguities of Democracy: The 
Demobilization of the Zimbabwean Ex-Combatants and the Ordeal of Rehabilitation, 1980-1993’ in J. Cilliers 
(ed.), Dismissed: Demobilization and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Africa (Institute for Defence 
Policy, South Africa), 47. 
22 Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration 
http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/4890 
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of the causes of conflict, with emphasis on engaging with the diversity of country contexts 
and abandonment of a ‘one size fits all’ approach.23 Political will is seen as a precondition of 
programme success, and to ensure this, the objectives and expected results of the 
reintegration programme should be clearly defined from the outset. As discussed in 2.3 of this 
report Community Approaches, participatory and ‘people centred’ approaches that 
incorporate ex-combatants (through veterans associations), communities and other 
stakeholders into the planning process is advocated at the design stage.24  
 
Integral features of reinsertion and reintegration programme design (see also 2.4 Tools and 
Methods) for the SIDDR, ILO and IDDRS include accountability and transparency; 
mainstreaming of gender and rights based approaches25 and realistic costing and flexibility in 
funding structures - allowing for adaptation in volatile post-conflict contexts.26 Eligibility 
criteria for ex-combatant entry into programmes should be established and should avoid 
allowing entry on the basis of weapons surrender; be based on principles of equity and; allow 
for equal access to reintegration opportunities for all groups facing reintegration problems – 
including I.D.U.s and refugees.  According to the ILO: ‘the social return to including 
vulnerable groups in broader programmes is likely to be higher than having programmes that 
segregate people into different schemes.’ 27 Where ex-combatants receive individual 
reintegration support, this should be limited and delivered through programmes that benefit 
the broader community. Effective programming ensures that: ‘receiving communities are 
adequately consulted and understand and accept that specifically tailored support given to ex-
combatants will enhance their own security’ through comprehensive sensitisation 
programmes (feeding into reconciliation processes) and programmes that are designed to 
move quickly from being ex-combatant specific to community-based and national 
development oriented.28The structure of reintegration packages will typically comprise one or 
all of the following elements (focused by sector) outlined in Box 1 below.    
 
Box 1: Reintegration Assistance 
Stop gap programmes (developed through the transitional subsistence support strategy) that are 
short-term in nature, focused on projects that can facilitate ex-combatant reintegration into the 
community (such as road building and infrastructure repair), ease the transition from demobilisation 
to reintegration and occupy the ex-combatant while more comprehensive and targeted reintegration 
opportunities are being developed. Links between infrastructure works and long-term sustainable 
employment can be forged.  
Education, training and skills development programmes through educational provision and 
                                                 
23 IDDRS. See also ILO (1997) Guidelines for Employment and Skills Training in Conflict-affected Countries. 
2.2 General Framework for Design and Implementation of Reintegration Programmes 
http://www2.ilo.org/public/english/employment/skills/training/publ/pub21.htm 
24 See for example K.Kingma (ed.) (2000) Demobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa, ibid.  
25 UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000). 
26 IDDRS Section 3.20 DDR Programme Design. 
27 ILO (1997) Guidelines for Employment and Skills Training in Conflict-affected Countries, ibid.   
28 IDDRS 3.20 DDR Programme Design 
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scholarship programmes, practically oriented vocational training, apprenticeships, on-the-job 
training and life skill development.29 This in turn means that sustainable reintegration develops the 
capacity (and technical resources) of national, regional and local training and educational 
institutions. 
Employment creation programmes through linkage with the private sector and programming in the 
informal economy. This should be “linked to patterns of demand for goods and services, and in 
particular should be co-ordinated with infrastructure availability and rehabilitation.”30 
Livelihood and income generation through the promotion of private sector and business development 
services (the latter addressing constraints faced by ex-combatants, such as lack of education, 
technical skills, market access and information), employment in existing enterprises, micro-and 
small business start-ups and the provision of micro-grants.31  
Source: ILO (1997) Guidelines for Employment and Skills Training in Conflict-affected Countries.  
 
2.3 Community-based approaches 
A strong relationship with the community is designated by the SIDDR and IDDRS as a vital 
entry point for reintegration activity. Receiving communities are: ‘a principal partner in DDR 
programmes, not only as beneficiaries, but also as participants in the planning and 
implementation of reintegration strategies and as stakeholders in the outcome.’ The 
community becomes the stakeholder and ‘owner’ of reintegration: ‘While national and 
international support is essential to create the basis for reintegration, it ultimately comes 
about as a result of sustainable, community-driven efforts.’ 32  Current community based 
approaches build on earlier UN initiatives such as the UNDP PRODERE33 programme in 
Central America and the Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Development Programme in 
Tajikistan.  
 
Box 2: Community-Based Approaches (USAID and Office of Transition Initiatives) 
Description Support is provided to build the foundations for participatory decision-making at the 
community level on the immediate priorities for rehabilitation, recovery, and/or 
survival needs. Representatives from local government, NGOs, and civil society 
decide on priority activities and implement them together. Activities might include 
improvements to schools, water, health, and sanitation facilities. 
Objectives  To re-establish informal local governance in situations of a chaotic or failed state 
and in the absence of a functioning national government.  
 To demonstrate the benefits of participatory decision-making through tangible 
projects that have immediate benefits.  
                                                 
29 Civilian social behaviour, non-violent conflict resolution and career planning. See for example ILO (1997) 
Guidelines for Employment and Skills Training in Conflict-affected Countries. Ibid. 
http://www2.ilo.org/public/english/employment/skills/training/publ/pub21.htm 
30 ILO (1997) Guidelines for Employment and Skills Training in Conflict-affected Countries. Ibid.  
31 Disbursed in instalments and on the basis of a clear start up plan. Local Economic Development Agencies 
(LEDAs) in Cambodia and Central America are cited as a successful model for micro-entrepreneurial 
development in post-conflict contexts. The LEDAS delivered business training, credit and counselling to micro 
and small enterprises and facilitated dialogue to identify business opportunities. 
32 IDDRS ibid. 
33 Development Programme for Displaced, Repatriated and Refugee Populations, funded by the Italian 
Government. 
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 To bring former enemies together to decide common priorities.  
 To build trust among participants (including trust between the community and 
donors).  
 To identify and facilitate the growth of new leadership within the community. 
Prerequisites  There must be access to the vulnerable populations who will form community 
groups.  
 Communities must be willing to provide labour or other in-kind contributions to 
ensure local ownership.  
Activities  Create informal local rehabilitation/development councils with wide community 
participation.  
 Support activities identified by local associations such as shelter, livestock, and 
income generation.  
 Fund grants to communities to repair and re-open community centers, markets, and 
schools that benefit everyone.  
 Find relevant international NGOs and donors to meet community needs in delivery 
of health and education services.  
 Establish links between public officials and ordinary citizens through organization 
and implementation of community improvement projects.  
Examples In Kosovo (1999-2001), OTI helped establish Community Improvement Councils 
(CICs) composed of 12-15 people reflecting the diversity of their local population. 
They identified their community's priority reconstruction needs and OTI provided the 
material resources. Together, OTI and the CICs implemented 375+ community 
improvement projects. The CICs emerged as representatives of their communities, 
providing other donors and international organizations with information on real needs 
and priorities as defined by Kosovars themselves. To facilitate positive, community-
based interaction among diverse groups of people in Macedonia (2001-2003) and to 
encourage citizen participation in community decision-making, OTI supported 210 
multi-ethnic initiatives through small grants in its first year. In 2002, approximately 
5,000 people were directly involved in identifying, designing, and implementing 
these local projects, while tens of thousands participated in and benefited from them. 
Projects included small-scale infrastructure reconstruction, such as repair of schools 
and clinics; removal of hate graffiti; rehabilitation of parks, cultural centres, and 
recreation facilities to promote positive social interaction between groups; and multi-
cultural events such as volunteer clean-up days, concerts, sports competitions, dance 
performances, summer camps, and art exhibitions. OTI-funded projects brought 
together different ethnic groups, members of opposing political parties, and different 
age groups, some for the first time since the conflict. By providing immediate, 
tangible signs of peace and progress at the community level, OTI worked to make 
hope a reality. 
Source: OTI and UNDP/ERD, Community-Based Approaches in Reintegration and Rehabilitation, October 
2000.  
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The use of community organizations, veterans’ associations 34  and informal localised 
networks and discussion groups in reintegration processes delivers multiple dividends 
according to the best practice guidelines of international and donor agencies.35 They allow 
communities to identify their own development needs; prevent ‘inconsistency between the 
perception of needs at the central level and actual needs of communities’36 and enhance 
monitoring and transparency: ‘if, on publicly accessible criteria, some communities gain 
disproportionately to their needs, it will be clear for all to see.’37 Community and informal 
and veteran’s networks also have value as vehicles for political reconciliation and political 
reintegration, providing a locus for sensitisation and reconciliation activities, with well 
designed, community based reintegration programmes allowing space for complex processes 
of peace building and dispute settlement capacity to be addressed. Ireland, Nicaragua, East 
Timor, Rwanda and South Africa count among a number of countries that have facilitated 
community healing and reconciliation through localised victim / ex-combatant dialogue 
processes. 38  Localisation / informalisation also creates a framework for broad political 
discussion: ‘which is concerned with collective responses to conflict-created needs’, 
facilitating the articulation of collective rather than subjective interests,39 promoting civic 
awareness. 
 
Box 3: Institutionalising Veterans Associations 
The Uganda Veterans Assistance Board (UVAB) 
 The UVAB was created by the Government of Uganda to facilitate the demobilisation 
and reintegration of 36,400 National Resistance Army soldiers. The Uganda Veterans 
Assistance Programme (UVAP), co-ordinated by the World Bank and implemented 
between 1992 and 1996 - additionally addressed the needs of 125,000 dependents. The 
UVAP provided a transitional safety net designed to meet basic needs for a six-month 
period and counselling and training. While economic reintegration proceeded relatively 
successfully, social reintegration was initially hindered by community mistrust despite 
high-level sensitisation campaigns. 
 Over the longer term- the return of veterans was seen to improve security. Key lessons 
identified by the World Bank stressed: the importance of political will and institutional 
implementation capacity – with the benefits of central coordination through a temporary 
agency, balanced by decentralizing implementation authority to the communities 
particularly emphasised; needs-based preparatory planning; provision of non-
transferable discharge certificate; identification of opportunities for veterans in product 
and factor markets; continuous information to beneficiaries about opportunities and 
constraints and; effective donor co-ordination. 
 The ease and success of reintegration was found to be determined by ‘the interplay of a 
                                                 
34 The AMODEG (Associacao Mocambicana dos Desmobilizados de Guerra) in Mozambique is frequently cited 
as an example of the importance of veterans’ associations as a form of social capital in support of economic and 
social reintegration 
35 See Ball, Nicole (1997) ‘Demobilizing and Reintegrating Soldiers: Lessons from Africa’, pp. 85–105 in K. 
Kumar (ed.) Rebuilding Societies after Civil War. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner; M. Berdal (1996) Disarmament 
and Demobilisation after Civil Wars. Oxford: Oxford University Press/Institute for Strategic Studies. 
36 ILO (1997) Guidelines for Employment and Skills Training in Conflict-affected Countries. Ibid. 
37 ILO (1997) Guidelines for Employment and Skills Training in Conflict-affected Countries. Ibid. 
38 See for example B. Greenbaum (2005) Evaluation of the 2005 Ex-Combatants' Dialogues, Centre for the 
Study of Violence and Reconciliation http://www.csvr.org.za/papers/papgreen.htm 
39 ILO (1997) Guidelines for Employment and Skills Training in Conflict-affected Countries. Ibid.  
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community's physical and social capital and a veteran's financial and human capital’.  
Source: http://www.worldbank.org/afr/findings/infobeng/infob12e.htm 
 
In particular, the engagement of local and national media in the dissemination of information 
about reintegration activities is emphasised. This enhances popular knowledge and 
understanding of reintegration beneficiaries, activities and programme objectives, reducing 
potential perceptions of injustice and grievance.40 To summarise, three general approaches to 
reintegration can be identified, with applicability determined by the nature, length and type of 
conflict, the manner of the conflict’s resolution and the post-conflict recovery priorities.  
  
Box 4: Tailoring Reintegration Approaches 
Approach Purpose Objective Characteristics Activities 
Short-term 
stabilization 
(reinsertion)  
Draw ex-combatants 
away from fighting / 
criminality until a 
peace mission is 
deployed, or security 
sector or political 
reform is completed. 
Provide rapid transitional 
support for resettlement 
and short-term income-
generation opportunities 
to potentially disruptive 
ex-combatants.  
Low cost per ex-
combatant. 
Short-term. 
Only viable when ex 
combatants do not 
represent a long-
term security threat. 
Information, counselling 
and referral services. 
Transitional support 
schemes (food, clothing, 
transportation, other). 
Short-term labour- 
intensive projects.  
Ex-
combatant-
focused  
reintegration 
Provide ex-
combatants with 
tailored, individually 
focused sustainable 
solutions for long- 
term reintegration. 
Engage ex-combatants in 
sustainable micro- projects
to reduce the long-term 
security risks they present.
Higher cost per ex-
combatant. 
Can create feelings 
of unfairness within 
community. 
To be used when ex-
combatants 
represent a long-
term threat to 
security. 
Information, counselling 
and referral services.  
Micro project 
development through 
grants. Training, 
technical advisory and 
related support services. 
Community- 
based 
reintegration 
Provide communities 
with tools and 
capacities to support 
reintegration of ex-
combatants, together 
with IDPs, refugees 
and other vulnerable 
groups. 
Supports ex-combatant 
reintegration as a 
component of wider, 
community-focused 
reconciliation and 
recovery programmes. 
Highest cost per ex-
combatant. May not 
address ex-
combatants’ 
concerns directly. 
Addresses needs of 
community as a 
whole. 
Community projects with 
greater inclusion of all 
social actors.  
Peace-building and 
reconciliation activities. 
Local security 
enhancement activities. 
Source: USAID / OTI  
 
2.4 Tools and Methods 
Data collection tools for programme design are a mechanism for linking reintegration to 
long-term development programmes. Economic reintegration opportunities – through training, 
wage- or self-employment need to be identified through early, detailed, comprehensive, 
disaggregated, gender sensitive and regularly updated data collection, mapping and 
assessment of socio-economic conditions, the labour market and the political and security 
                                                 
40 Job referral services, public information about the duration, beneficiaries and success of reintegration projects. 
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situation. These data collection processes that frame reintegration programme design, such as 
the Common Country Assessment (CCA) and United Nations Development Assistance 
Framework (UNDAF) provide an opportunity for reintegration to:41 ‘link seamlessly with 
long-term poverty reduction and development activities’42 through wider national recovery 
programmes and strategies such as Post-Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA),43transitional 
results matrices or frameworks (TRMs/TRFs) and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(PRSPs).  
 
Box 5: Data Collation for Reintegration Design 
Labour and Markets 
 What is the local demand for goods, services and labour (skilled, unskilled)?  
 What are potential areas for new market growth and economic reintegration opportunities?  
 Are there cultural or social labour norms relating to sex divisions or sex specific restrictions in the 
labour market?  
 Can youth and older children enter the labour market safely? Is legislation in place to protect 
children from exposure to the worst forms of child labour?  
 Have labour norms changed during the conflict? 
 Which services (social- and business-related; public and private) are available? Can services be 
made available easily? Who supplies services, or can supply them? What support is required to 
upgrade services that are essential for reintegration? 
 What other war-affected groups are present in the area (or will return), and what type of assistance 
will they receive? What are their needs? Can the reintegration programme indirectly supply their 
needs? 
Economic 
 What is the overall economic situation of the country?  
 Which are the most dynamic, or potentially dynamic, economic sectors? Do these sectors present 
reintegration opportunities for both male and female ex-combatants and for adults, youth and older 
children? 
 What other opportunities are, or can be, available to former combatants, given their existing skill 
sets? How can their skills be improved in a way that increases their employability? 
 Have opportunities for public–private partnerships been explored? 
Infrastructure  
 What infrastructure exists to allow economic activity to take place (e.g., roads, communications, 
electricity supplies, etc.)? Where are the worst bottlenecks? 
Services  
 What business development services are available, and where? What services could be developed 
with minimal support? 
Training providers  
 What education and training providers and institutions exist? What subjects/skills and age groups 
do they specialize in? 
 What capacity do they have to support the DDR programme? 
                                                 
41 The UNDAF links programmes to national priorities, including the Millennium Development Goals. 
42 IDDRS. Ibid. 
43 Generally prepared by the World Bank and the UN, the PCNA defines short- (12–24 months) and medium-
term (24–60 months) recovery priorities and financial requirements on the basis of an overall long-term 
recovery goal. International donors’ conferences are built around the PCNA document. 
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Having assessed best practice in reintegration, the following section addresses current 
strategies for long-term development in post-conflict country contexts in order to highlight 
points of linkage, institutional coordination and programmatic convergence.  
 
3. Post Conflict Development: Connecting Reintegration and Long Term 
Development 
The 2000s saw an enhanced appreciation among donors and the IFIs of the challenge of 
operating in post-conflict environments.44 Specifically there was awareness of the need to 
address the economic determinants of the conflict ‘trap’ 45  (with the evidence that post-
conflict countries have a 44 per cent chance of reverting to conflict during the first five years 
after the onset of peace) and boost economic development in order to reduce the opportunity 
costs of armed rebellion. In revised strategies for development (and conflict reduction), 
conflict sensitivity is stressed under the ‘do no harm’ principle and poverty is addressed as a 
multidimensional phenomenon that has multiple and interlinked causes.46 This refinement of 
approaches has been underpinned by the emergence of new perspectives on security, 
specifically the growing prominence of the human security perspective47and the integration 
of a rights based approach to development.48 This is based on a: ‘growing recognition of the 
crucial links between human rights violations, poverty, exclusion, vulnerability and 
conflict.’49  
 
3.1 Improving Financial Assistance to Conflict Afflicted States 
In recognition of the complex proliferation and resulting shortcomings in donor aid provision, 
donors and national governments issued the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005, 
with the aim of reducing transaction costs and optimalising the anti-poverty and growth 
                                                 
44 P. Uvin (2002) 'The Development/Peacebuilding Nexus: A Typology and History of Changing Paradigms', 
Journal of Peacebuilding and Development, vol. 1, no. 1; 
45 Collier et al, (2003), ‘Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy’, ibid; Collier and 
Hoeffler (2005), “Resource Rents, Governance and Conflict”, ibid. Collier (2004), “Development and Conflict”, 
Centre for the Study of African Economies. Ibid.  
46 The DAC Guidelines on Poverty Reduction (2001); http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/14/2672735.pdf 
47 R. Paris (2001) ‘Human Security, Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?’, International Security, vol. 26, no. 2; L. 
Axworthy (1997) ‘Canada and Human Security: The Need for Leadership’, International Journal, vol. 52, no. 2, 
Spring.; UNDP (1994) United Nations Development Programme Human Development Report, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press; UN Commission on Human Security (2003) Human Security Now; S. Alkire (2003) ‘A 
Conceptual Framework for Human Security’ Working Paper 2, Centre for Research on Inequality, Human 
Security and Ethnicity, CRISE, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford. 
48 World Bank (2005), Equity and Development. World Development Report 2006, Washington, DC; UNDP 
(2005), Human Development Report (2005). International Cooperation at a Crossroads: Aid, Trade and 
Security in an Unequal World, New York. D. Kaufmann (2005) ‘Human Rights and Governance: The Empirical 
Challenge’ in P. Alston and M. Robinson (eds.), Human Rights and Development: Towards Mutual 
Reinforcement, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 352-402. 
49  OECD (2007) Action-Oriented Policy Paper on Human Rights and Development; OECD (2006) The 
Development Dimension: Integrating Human Rights into Development: Donor Approaches, Experiences and 
Challenges, OECD Development Dimension Series,  
http://www.oecd.org/document/24/0,3343,fr_2649_34565_37045656_1_1_1_1,00.html. O. Thoms and J. Ron  
(2007) ‘Do Human Rights Violations Cause Internal Conflict?’ Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 29, no. 3, pp.674–
705, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore. 
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inducing impacts of increased levels of aid. The Paris Declaration stressed five partnership 
principles: developing country leadership on development policies and plans (ownership); 
that donors base support on the recipient countries development strategies and systems 
(alignment); that donors coordinate aid (harmonisation); that donors and recipient countries 
orient their activities toward desired results (managing for results) and are accountable to 
each other (mutual accountability).  
 
In relation to conflict afflicted states, financial assistance flows had traditionally been volatile 
and dependent on a limited number of donors. 50  In order to address this, the donor 
community devised a model of best practice for international engagement (see Box 6 below). 
supported by an annual reporting system Monitoring Resource Flows to Fragile States.51 
This aimed to improve transparency and coordination among donors and, building on the 
Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States, counter the negative impact 
of volatile and weak aid flows, while drawing donor’s attention to the importance of 
sequencing development, diplomatic and security efforts in conflict afflicted countries. 
 
Box 6: Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States 
• Avoid unintentional exclusionary effects of uncoordinated donor behaviour and address the 
problem of ‘aid orphans’ 
• Act fast when windows of opportunity arise; 
• Stay engaged long enough, especially in post-conflict situations, and 
• Reduce the destabilising effects of volatile patterns of international engagement. 
 
Recognising the limited capacity of conflict affected countries to implement public finance 
and related reforms necessary for debt relief and lending that was integral for post conflict 
reconstruction, the IMF and World Bank devised new lending modalities that included Post 
Conflict Fund grants and pre-arrears clearance grants to post-conflict countries with large and 
protracted arrears (2001). This freed up resources, creating an enabling environment for 
reconstruction and long-term development. A third mechanism for mobilising flexible 
financing for essential or urgent activities in conflict affected countries was the Multi-Donor 
Trust Fund (MDTF) initiative.  
 
Box 7: Lending Initiatives to Post Conflict Countries 
 The Post-Conflict Fund 
• Established in 1997as part of the World Bank’s Development Grant Facility (DGF) 
• The aim of the PCF is to position the Bank for constructive engagement in countries where 
normal instruments cannot be used or may not be appropriate.  
• PCF grants (which range from $25,000 to $1 million) place a premium on: (i) innovative 
                                                 
50 Central African Republic, Togo, Liberia, Uzbekistan, Nigeria, Sudan, Yemen and Zimbabwe rely mainly on 
three donors, which account for more than 50% of their total net ODA respectively. OECD (2005) Senior Level 
Forum on Development Effectiveness in Fragile States Unclassified DCD (2006)  
http://www.oecd.org/document/30/0,3343,fr_2649_33693550_33964254_1_1_1_1,00.html; OECD (2006) 
Development Cooperation Directorate Monitoring Resource Flows to Fragile States 2005 Report,  Fragile 
States Group (FSG).  
51 OECD Senior Level Forum on Development Effectiveness in Fragile States,  ibid. 
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approaches to conflict and development; (ii) partnerships with donors, the UN system and 
NGOs; (iii) appropriate exit strategies, especially in terms of potential for replicability and 
scaling up; and (iv) scope for using grants to leverage additional funding and thus enhance 
impact.  
• Grant proposals are approved by the PCF Committee that includes representatives from the 
Social Development Department and CPR Unit 
• In 1999, range of grants broadened to include conflict analysis, capacity building, community 
development, youth-at-risk, psychosocial and mental health in post-conflict populations, and 
focused research on the causes of conflict.  
• 126 projects in 37 countries have been approved since 1997, financed with grants worth 
$63.5m. Examples include grants to support delivery of health services through the 
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in Somalia; an action plan 
on HIV/AIDS in Somalia; a project to empower women through socioeconomic development 
in Tajikistan; capacity building and development in Timor-Leste and reintegration of street 
children in urban areas of DRC. 
 
Pre-Arrears Clearance Grants 
• Measures performance by a set of 12 Post-Conflict Progress Indicators (PCPI) designed 
specifically for post-conflict countries  
• Allows for exceptional levels of international development assistance for up to 4 years (an 
increase from the initial 3 years, but with lower levels of initial assistance in line with low 
levels of ‘absorptive capacity’). This is followed by a 3 year ‘phase down’ to performance-
based norms 
• PCPI ratings are clustered around security and reconciliation; economic recovery; and social 
inclusion and social development 
• Post-conflict countries eligible for exceptional IDA allocations based on PCPI ratings, may 
receive up to 40% of their IDA allocation as grants for a limited period once their arrears 
have been cleared.  
 
Multidonor Trust Funds 
• West Bank Gaza: 27donors $269 million Holst Fund + coupled with a $380 million trust fund 
from Bank net income; 
• Bosnia: $150 million trust fund for emergency projects ($25 million in grants, $125 million in 
concessional loans); 
• Timor-Leste: $80 million multi-donor trust fund started with $10 million of Bank net income 
• Sierra Leone: administration of a $12 million multi-donor trust fund for DDR, in tandem with 
a $25million IDA credit for the reintegration of war-affected populations; and 
• Greater Great Lakes Region: $350 million trust fund for demobilization and reintegration. 
 
 
Regional financial institutions such as the Asian Development Bank, African Development 
Bank, Islamic Development Bank and Inter-American Development Bank assumed an 
increasingly influential lending, collaboration and co-ordination role.  
 
3.1.1 Needs Assessments 
15 
 
Heightened sensitivity to conflict contexts catalysed methodological and typological 
refinement of programming environments (represented by the weak, fragile and failing states 
agenda) and the introduction of new conflict sensitive tools (such as Conflict Analysis 
Frameworks, Peace and Conflict Impact Assessments) and needs assessment strategies,52  
such as the humanitarian needs assessment (dealing with the immediate conflict / post 
conflict environment); the UNs Post Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA) and World Bank’s 
Transitional Support Strategy (TSS) and Country Assistance Strategy (CAS).53 These address 
short- to medium-term reconstruction and rehabilitation priorities, feeding into long-term 
development planning exercises, such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers.  
 
Needs assessments have the potential to become the principle mechanism for embedding 
reintegration into development strategies.54 The assessments determine short- and medium-
term recovery and rehabilitation priorities, serving as a mechanism for raising and structuring 
lending and financial support. As outlined in Box 7 needs assessments have multiple 
objectives: serving as a vehicle for a mutually agreed transition strategy among stakeholders; 
overcoming the consequences of conflict; preventing renewed conflict; shaping recovery 
priorities; establishing the financial implications of addressing immediate needs and; linking 
short and medium-term priorities to long term goals.55 The value of the Needs Assessment is 
that it can connect the CCA and UNDAF to longer-term strategies such as the PRSPs, 
enabling coordination of planning. The Assessment process also emphasises stakeholder 
participation including through workshops and validation meetings, enabling DDR planners 
and practitioners to feed into assessment and analysis of the post-conflict phase. Stakeholder 
engagement and consultation also provides a forum for representatives of ex-combatants (and 
at the local level, the ex-combatants themselves) to articulate their needs and interests into the 
overall development process, while providing an arena for the training and employment 
offered through reintegration packages to inform or be informed by national and local 
development strategies. Here, the community is a vital actor representing an agglomeration of 
stakeholders through the Community Based Approaches, (discussed in Section 2), which can 
provide a natural bridge from reintegration to long-term focused programme and project 
development.        
 
At the institutional level, moves to harness linkages are represented by the creation of 
integrated post conflict reconstruction units such as the Conflict Prevention and 
Reconstruction Unit (CPR) in the World Bank. In 2002, UNHCR, UNDP and the World 
Bank began collaboration on the ‘4Rs’ initiative, posited as an innovative tool for: ‘bridging 
repatriation, reintegration, rehabilitation and reconstruction processes to promote durable 
                                                 
52 Such as the World Banks Conflict Analysis Framework. See FEWER, International Alert and Saferworld 
(2004) Resource Pack on Conflict-Sensitive Approaches, FEWER, International Alert and Saferworld. 
http://www.conflictsensitivity.org/resource_pack.html 
53 World Bank (1997) A Framework for World Bank Involvement in Post-Conflict Reconstruction. Ibid. 
54 See for example, GTZ - T. Schaef  (2004) Working Paper 9. Case Study Liberia: Post Conflict Needs 
Assessment (PCNAs): Case Study Liberia. In Country Study. Eschborn and GTZ – C. Schenk (2004) Working 
Paper 7. Case Study East Timor: Post-Conflict Reconstruction Needs Assessment in Timor Leste: Lessons 
Learnt and Good Practices. In-Country Study. Eschborn.   
55 See GTZ Needs Assessments in Post-Conflict Situations. Working Paper No. 11. Eschborn.   
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solutions for refugees and displaced populations, and thus contribute to poverty reduction.’ 
Three pilot countries, Eritrea, Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka, were chosen to trial the approach, 
which seeks to promote inter-agency co-ordination and maximum flexibility for field staff.  
 
Box 7: Post-Conflict Framework Assessments 
Post Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA) 56 
 
• A key entry point for conceptualizing, negotiating and financing post-conflict recovery 
strategies. 
• A complex analytical process led by the national authorities, supported by the 
international community and carried out by multilateral agencies (UN and World Bank) 
on their behalf, with the closest possible collaboration of national stakeholders and civil 
society.  
• Aims to overcome consequences of conflict or war, prevent renewed outbreak and shape 
the short-term and potentially mid-term recovery priorities as well as articulate their 
financial implications on the basis of an overall long-term vision or goal.  
• Provides donors, national authorities, (NGOs) and other stakeholders, with a 
comprehensive and fairly objective estimate of needs and recovery priorities  
• Provides a conceptual basis for an Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP) and 
World Bank and UN country strategies (Country Assistance Strategy—CAS; and UN 
Development Framework—UNDAF, respectively). 
 
Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) 
 
• Prepared by the World Bank for active borrowers from the International Development 
Association (IDA) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD) to determine IFI financial, technical or advisory support levels;  
• The starting point of the CAS is the country’s own development vision, as defined in a 
PRSP or other country-owned process.  
• Developed in consultation with country authorities, civil society organizations, 
development partners and stakeholders. 
• Sets out a selective program of IFI support and designed to promote collaboration and 
coordination among development partners in a country.  
• Includes a comprehensive diagnosis of the development challenges facing the country, 
including the incidence, trends, and causes of poverty. 
• Identifies key areas where IFI assistance can have the biggest impact on poverty 
reduction.  
• Takes into account the country’s creditworthiness, state of institutional development, 
implementation capacity, governance, and other sectoral and cross-cutting issues.  
• Implementation and progress in achieving stated outcomes is tracked through a framework 
of targets and indicators to monitor Bank Group. 
 
 
                                                 
56 August 2004 UNDG Practical Guide to Multilateral Needs Assessments in Post-Conflict Situations 
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3.1.2 Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
The PRSP process is intended to place poverty reduction at the heart of development 
objectives by establishing a framework for ensuring government and donor coherence in 
identifying and designing policy interventions that deliver pro-poor economic growth.57 The 
PRSP structures relations between the donor community and recipient country, with approval 
of the PSRP by the IMF and World Bank providing a basis for concessional lending and debt 
relief under the HIPC Initiative.  
 
Box 8: Design Principles of PRSPs 
• Country specifity, ownership and leadership, with broad input from civil society, elected 
institutions, key donors and relevant IFIs; 
• Development from an understanding of the nature and determinants of poverty and the links 
between public actions and poverty outcomes, recognizing that sustained poverty reduction 
will not be possible without rapid economic growth and: 
• Orientation toward achieving outcome-related goals for poverty reduction 
 
 
There is a strong emphasis on instituting participatory approaches in the PSRP, with best 
practice for the second generation of PRSPs emphasising: ‘regular public-private dialogue 
(PPD) by sub-sector or at the appropriate policy level, combined with bottom-up 
communication processes to ensure that local-level issues are fed into higher level policy 
processes’. This creates a vehicle for linking reintegration to longer-term strategies, by 
engaging development planners with local level needs and interests at an early stage. It also 
creates a ‘voice’ and stake in the peace process, undercutting the potential for the exclusion 
and marginalisation of ex-combatants and their communities. There are also political benefits 
to be gained, with dialogue and consultation assisting in the re-legitimisation of government 
and formal political processes, reducing perceptions of alienation and exclusion that could be 
manifest through recourse to violence. The new best practice PRSP approach also stresses the 
need to broaden-out private sector representation to representatives and participants from the 
informal sector and small and medium enterprises. This creates another channel for designing 
models of sustainable reintegration by linking training and employment strategy to long term 
development planning.58    
 
Of the 30 countries that completed the first PRSP process and 22 that finalised the interim 
PRSP, 25 were conflict affected. Experience from this first round drew attention to the 
immense institutional, economic and social challenges post-conflict countries face in devising 
their PRSPs. 59  This has resulted in recognition of the need for greater flexibility in 
developing the PRSP framework in conflict affected countries and understanding that: 
‘PRSPs in conflict-affected countries […] should look and feel very different from other 
countries’ – specifically though a more detailed focus on factors that affect the risk of 
                                                 
57 On pro-poor growth see World Bank (2005) ‘Pro-poor Growth in the 1990s. Lessons and Insights from 14 
countries’. Operationalizing Pro-Poor Growth Research Program, The World Bank, Washington DC. 
58 OECD DAC (1999) Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in Development Co-operation, 
http://www.oecd.org/document/28/0,3343,en_2649_34541_1887516_1_1_1_1,00.html  
59 The Role of the World Bank in Conflict and Development: An Evolving Agenda, ibid. 
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conflict. 60  Leading from this, and indicative of the new flexible and conflict sensitive 
approach, there is greater acknowledgement of the potentially destabilising effects of over-
emphasising macroeconomic stability and state re-structuring in conflict affected countries, 
specifically when restoring macroeconomic balance is seen as a trade off with popular 
demands for social welfare. According to the World Bank:  ‘Social policy is relatively more 
important and macro-policy relatively less important in post-conflict countries’ and that:  
‘relative to the normal post-conflict strategies adopted, social policy should be assigned 
somewhat higher priority.61 This recognition of the importance of flexibility in the PRSP 
process allows reintegration needs (such as employment creation) to be factored into long-
term development strategy.   
 
3.2 New Best Practice Approaches  
In addition to the opportunities presented by Needs Assessment and PSRP processes for 
linking reintegration and long-term development, new best practice in development 
approaches (the Post-Washington Consensus or Pro-Poor Agenda) also provides a structural 
framework for designing policies that can improve linkages and create an environment 
conducive to successful reintegration.  
 
3.2.1 Dialogue and participation 
Integral to the revised pro-poor approach is a emphasis on broad-based formal and informal 
mechanisms for dialogue, consultation and participation because; ‘Without equitable dialogue, 
governments follow the loudest, most powerful voices, which rarely speak in the best interest 
of broad-based private sector growth, let alone poverty reduction.’ 62 In order to ensure pro-
poor outcomes, the policy process: ‘must build on structures and process that are deliberately 
set up to elicit citizen participation in policy formulation and implementation, and promote 
accountability of policy makers.’63 Expanding mechanisms for dialogue and participation - 
horizontally and vertically – from the national level down to local communities is now 
prioritised for the construction of legitimate, broad based and responsive development 
policies.64 Communities are at the core of aid and development thinking, on the basis that 
they are better positioned to identify recovery priorities. 
 
 The community driven development approach (CDD) is particularly stressed in post-conflict 
country contexts. A key operating principle of the World Bank, the CDD approach: ‘typically 
tries to improve a low level, stable equilibrium of service provision and community 
infrastructure’. 65  CDD has evolved into community-driven reconstruction (CDR) that: 
                                                 
60 The Role of the World Bank in Conflict and Development: An Evolving Agenda, ibid.  
61 The Role of the World Bank in Conflict and Development: An Evolving Agenda.I bid.  
62OECD DAC (2006) Promoting Pro-Poor Growth: Private Sector Development, Section 6, ‘Constructing 
Inclusive Public-Private Dialogue’.  http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/24/40/36563837.pdf 
63OECD DAC (2006) Promoting Pro-Poor Growth: Private Sector Development. Ibid. 
64 OECD DAC (1997) Final Report of the DAC Ad hoc Working Group on Participatory Development and 
Good Governance. http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/44/12/1894642.pdf 
65 The World Bank has supported CDD projects in Rwanda, Colombia (the Program for Development and Peace 
in Magdalena Medio) and Timor Leste (Community Empowerment Project). In Rwanda, this focused on support 
for the reintegration of returning refugees, social rehabilitation and decentralization. In Colombia, the project 
supported community based participatory approach to development and peace and the Timor Leste initiative 
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‘generally aims to support reconstruction following large devastation caused by conflict, and 
in situations of great economic, institutional and communal flux.’ The demand-led approach 
of the CDR process is seen by the World Bank as an innovative way of bridging the relief to 
development gap, by allowing communities to: ‘drive the reconstruction process without the 
need to label activities emergency or developmental.’ The CDD and CDR approach presents 
a valuable opportunity for connecting reintegration to short-, medium- and long-term 
development, specifically were Community Based Approaches to reintegration allow for an 
established and identifiable community of stakeholders to be engaged in CDD. Here, the best 
practice framework for reintegration naturally parlays into a community of stakeholders in 
reconstruction and development strategy, programmes and processes.  
 
3.2.2 The Private Sector 
New best practice approaches from international and donor agencies operating in conflict 
prone countries continues to emphasise the role of the private sector – in line with the original 
Washington Consensus model. Improvements in the investment climate (enforcing property 
and contract rights, reducing corruption, reforming tax and regulatory regimes) are seen as a 
driver of economic growth and poverty reduction, with the private sector a principal actor in 
breaking the conflict trap.66 However, best practice has moved away from an emphasis on 
supply-side interventions (focused on ‘large’ private economic interests) toward market-side 
support that promotes an enabling environment for sustainable and ‘inclusive’ patterns of 
private sector and pro-poor growth.67 As outlined by OECD DAC: ‘The emerging pro-poor 
agenda for private sector development is both different and broader than the previous 
agenda.’ 68  Consequently interventions to boost the private sector can be designed to 
strengthen the connections between reintegration and long-term development. 
 
The focus now is on designing incentives to private sector activity that can allow for: ‘more 
and better jobs, higher incomes, better returns on goods sold and greater affordability of 
essential goods and services.’ 69 Where implemented, this can enhance links between 
reintegration, reconstruction and development by promoting private sector participation in the 
design of reintegration strategies and by forging a macro-economic environment conducive to 
better identification and targeting of ex-combatant educational and training needs, and the 
creation of micro-credit frameworks that can stimulate small and medium business 
development and linkages into the broader economy. This undercuts the tendency for 
template approaches, such as schemes that train ex-combatants for non-existent jobs or which 
provide skills that are not appropriately matched to economic and development objectives.70 
Early consultation with an incentivised private sector can reap significant economic and 
                                                                                                                                                        
funded the creation of democratically elected village development councils and provided funds so they could 
undertake local reconstruction projects    
66 World Development Report (2005) A Better Business Climate for Everyone. Washington, D.C.; World Bank 
(2005) Pro-Poor growth in the 1990s Lessons and Insights from 14 Countries. Ibid.  
67 OECD (2004) ‘Accelerating Pro-Poor Growth through Support for Private Sector Development. An 
Analytical Framework’, Organisation For Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris 
68 OECD (2006) Promoting Pro-Poor Growth: Private Sector Development. Ibid.  
69 OECD (2006) Promoting Pro-Poor Growth: Private Sector Development. Ibid. 
70 Becker (2003), ‘Private Sector Development in (Post)-Conflict Situations - Experience by Inter-national 
Organizations, Draft Report 15.04.2003, GTZ, Eschborn 
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political dividends, enhancing development synergies across the violence to peace continuum 
while providing a stake for both the private sector and ex-combatants in peace and the 
national development ‘vision’. Context specific interventions can: ‘be used as a vehicle to 
create short-term employment opportunities during the fragile transition to peace. Small-scale 
infrastructure programmes can be designed to promote local businesses’, while ‘large-scale 
economic infrastructure programmes can, if properly timed and coordinated, make significant 
contributions to the long-term productivity of businesses.’71 
 
A further significant revision in best practice relates to understanding of the informal sector. 
Previously policies to encourage formalisation were stressed but these have been challenged 
by the ‘decent work’ approach that emphasises the importance of: ‘recognising and 
maximising the contribution of […] informal enterprises, family-run farms and self-employed 
people.’72  This is particularly beneficial for poverty reduction for poor and marginalised 
groups, such as women and arguably ex-combatants, by allowing their contribution to, and 
benefits from economic growth to be captured, expanded and facilitated.73 More broadly, 
with its emphasis on disaggregated value chain analysis, the new market-side approach to 
private sector development allows obstacles to the potential economic contribution of poor 
groups, to be identified and minimised, serving as a valuable tool in the design of 
reintegration strategies and allowing for a connection between reintegration packages and 
broader national development plans. 74    
 
3.2.3 Financial Sector 
The emphasis on pro-poor growth has catalysed a significant re-evaluation of donor 
approaches to the financial sector. Best practice now places less emphasis on the privatization 
of provision (which led to the consolidation, centralisation and reduced availability of 
banking and credit in the 1980s and 1990s) and stresses donor support for the start up and 
financing of geographically spread microfinance institutions; linkages between microfinance 
and the banking sector and; encouragement of a solid institutional and legal environment in 
order to promote broader and deeper financial sector activity and access. As with other 
elements of the new best practice guidelines, implementation of this approach by national 
authorities, donors and the private sector can be integrated with community based 
reintegration and reconstruction processes, providing structural mechanisms for sustainable 
community development and successful reintegration through support to livelihoods and 
employment opportunities.  
 
The previous two section points to the evolution and institutionalisation of approaches in 
reintegration and long-term development practice that can maximise success in reintegration 
                                                 
71 GTZ (2006) Private Sector Development in Reintegration and Reconstruction Programmes: Eschborn. 
72 From this perspective, the informal economy is recognised as a long-term, structural feature of economic 
development. Promoting Pro-Poor Growth: Private Sector Development, OECD 2006 
73 Cartmill, 1999; Tzannatos, 1999; The Gender, Institutions and Development Database, 
http://www.oecd.org/dev/institutions/GIDdatabase 
74 Promoting Pro-Poor Growth: Private Sector Development, OECD 2006 p 54; Beck (2004). ‘Finance, 
inequality and poverty: Cross country Evidence’, World Bank Policy, Research Paper WPS33338, 2004; DFID 
‘The Importance of Financial Sector Development for Growth and Poverty Reduction; DFID, August 2004 
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by bridging this to post-conflict reconstruction strategies and priorities. The following two 
sections address the limitations of these policies and assumptions, demonstrating that there is 
still a long way to go before effective connections from short- to long-term process and 
programmes can be made.  
 
4. Operationalising Best Practice in Reintegration: Challenges and 
Constraints 
There are grandiose expectations relating to the synergies between reintegration and long-
term development and peacebuilding. But as this section outlines, reintegration activities, and 
DDR processes more broadly, demonstrate significant limitations. Best practice in 
documentation and declaratory statements has yet to translate into effective reintegration 
experiences on the ground. Until these problems within DDR as a ‘standalone’ programming 
area are addressed, it is highly unlikely that the expectations of connectivity and linkage can 
be realised, and the process of effectively embedding DDR into national development 
strategies accomplished. 
 
4.1 Community Approaches and Local Ownership 
The emphasis on local ownership and community engagement in DDR design and 
programming fails to engage with serious impediments to the roll-out of this type of approach. 
While there have been successful examples of community-based and delivered DDR,75 the 
limitations are inadequately addressed in the documentation. Firstly, community approaches 
are not necessarily appropriate, or easily embedded in certain country contexts. The most 
successful experiences have been in those countries where ex-combatants had already begun 
to rebuild their communities before the DDR process began (Uganda, Somaliland and Eritrea 
76) or never left the community setting (for example URNG in Guatemala77). These factors 
do not pertain to all post-conflict settings, many of which have few community-based NGOs 
or history of community-oriented development and reconciliation processes. The scale of the 
conflict (which can vary from region to region and community to community) also impacts 
on the capacity to implement community based approaches. In Sierra Leone, the former head 
of the DDR commission emphasised the lack of viable communities into which former 
combatants could reintegrate: ‘Many refugees and displaced people were still returning home 
and much basic infrastructure from schools to health clinics had to be rebuilt. Helping such 
communities revive was an enormous task.’ 78  
 
A second problem lies in defining ‘the community’, particularly in the dislocation of the post-
conflict context. There is a tendency in the best practice guidelines to simplify the 
                                                 
75 Exceptions being successful community based programmes in Uganda, Somaliland and Eritrea 
76 M. Berdal (1996) Disarmament and Demobilisation after Civil Wars. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press/Institute for Strategic Studies; E. M. Bruchhaus and M. Amanuel (2000) ‘“Leaving the Warm House”: 
The Impact of Demobilization in Eritrea’, pp. 95–131 in K. Kingma (ed.) Demobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa: 
The Development and Security Impacts. Ibid.  
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Foundación Guillermo Toriello. 
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complexities and intra-group dynamics of individual communities. In an exploration of the 
reintegration of forcibly abducted people (FAPs) in Uganda, Muwonge79found that:  
 
Community based reintegration suffers from a lack of shared vision between the 
community and the FAPs. While the community provides the basic necessities for 
survival, the FAPs generally feel that this is insufficient given what they have been 
forced to endure. This failure to anticipate the expectations of the FAPs is at the heart 
of the dysfunction within the IDP community. 
  
Thirdly, ex-combatant preference for urban reintegration can pose operational challenges for 
community based approaches, which are typically more sustainable and effective when 
focused on rural areas and in cases where ex-combatants return to their former communities. 
The case studies from Liberia, the Balkans and Central America reflect the difficulty of 
locating and monitoring urban-based ex-combatants and of rolling out community-based 
approaches where the ex-combatant has no history of living in the community of return. 
Moreover the momentum of top-down approaches is underestimated. According to Muggah: 
‘DDR is usually mandated by UN Security Council resolutions, terms and timelines are 
determined by outside donors and the process is usually part of on-going peace operations. 
Thus by definition it is top-down.’80   The danger that existing structures and processes at the 
community level may be undermined by ‘externally imposed’ DDR programmes has been 
flagged and reintegration programmes criticised as donor driven exercises that fail to connect 
with community needs. In Sierra Leone: ‘DDR had community-oriented dimensions, but it 
did not draw upon a community participatory approach or for communities to be the prime 
beneficiaries […] the lack of community-informed perspectives and participation in some of 
its programming as they were rolled out had significant negative impacts.’81 In East Timor, 
Peake found that the community-based RESPECT programme was overly complicated, 
flawed in design, had no clear audience, lacked monitoring and suffered from an absence of 
local ownership and government buy-in.82 
 
Where community-based initiatives have been launched in a favourable environment, they 
have repeatedly suffered from a lack of donor and national level financing. Community-level 
activities are not accorded the level of importance as national reconstruction and 
peacebuilding initiatives, in either financial or legislative terms. Linked with this, community 
connections to long-term development and peacebuilding is weak, and mechanisms for 
articulating local aims and ambitions to national policy strategy development are negligible.   
 
                                                 
79 M. Muwonge (2007) ‘Community Based Reintegration of Ex-Combatants: A Case Study of the LRA in 
Northern Uganda’ paper submitted to the Fourth International Institute for Peace Through Tourism African 
Conference.  http://www.iipt.org/africa2007/PDFs/Muwonge.pdf 
80 R. Muggha (2006) ‘Reflections on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration in Sudan’, Small Arms 
Survey, Geneva, and Oxford http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?ID=2795 
81 Solomon and Ginifer CICS Working Paper. 
82 Gordon Peake CICS Working Paper 
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4.2 Resources  
The financing of DD and specifically reintegration activities has been a problem, raising 
serious questions as to the sustainability and viability of these programmes and the 
commitment of donors to reintegration and the forging of effective links with long term 
development processes.83 The Secretary General of the UN has noted that: ‘securing reliable 
funding in support of the ‘Rs’ is of the utmost importance to ensure adequate implementation 
of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes’.84 This is despite the low cost 
of reintegration programmes, the Escola de Cultura for example estimating disarmament and 
reintegration of over a million ex-combatants costing the equivalent of only 2% of the 
world’s military expenditure.85  
 
A significant problem is that donor funding is largely absorbed by the technical, more visible 
(and time sensitive) elements of disarmament and demobilization, to the neglect of more 
complex reintegration activities that require a long-term commitment. According to Muggah: 
‘Donors and DDR planners repeatedly privilege more visible activities such as the gathering 
of hardware, at the expense of the more complex process of regenerating the capacities and 
capabilities of beneficiaries and communities.’86 The EU Expert Seminar on DDR noted that: 
‘While the majority of funds for specific and narrow “DDR programmes” get sucked into the 
demobilisation process, too little attention is given to livelihood support activities.’87The 
Final Communique of the Dakar Seminar on the Challenge of Re-integrating Ex-Combatants 
in DDR Programmes in West Africa highlighted: ‘inadequate or delays in funding, 
complexity of funding mechanisms, lack of coordination among donors, multiplicity of 
funding mechanisms’88 and a fragmented reintegration financing architecture as the central 
problems facing reintegration activities in the region. 
 
In Sierra Leone, Solomon and Ginifer found that: ‘Reintegration financing shortfalls were a 
major barrier […] to putting into place sustainable programming. The UN Secretary-General 
warned in May 2002 that a lack of funds was delaying the resettlement of thousands of 
former combatants […]. A major problem was that most of the donor funds were invested in 
disarmament and demobilisation, leaving little for the reintegration phase.’ Further to this: 
‘The NCDDR tried targeting ex-combatants with short-term reintegration programmes, but 
because of limited funds reintegration was held back, while local NCDDR partners also had 
difficulties in delivering medium- and longer-term reintegration, due to a lack of resources.’ 
In Bosnia Herzegovina (underscoring the generalised nature of the problem), the IOM 
Transitional Assistance to Former Soldiers programme, (2002-2004) received only 20% of 
                                                 
83 Progress Report on Ways to Combat Subregional and Cross-Border Problems in West Africa, UN 11/02.2005 
(S/2005/86) 
84 EU and DDR: Supporting Security and Development. Expert seminar, Brussels, July 2006.  
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87 EU and DDR: Supporting Security and Development. Expert seminar, Brussels, July 2006.  
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the $7.4m funding required.89 In Central American experience, there was a $600m financing 
shortfall in the El Salvador re-integration programme, with donors slow in following through 
on initial commitments, 90 while in Nicaragua, donor failure to disburse financial 
commitments led to the collapse of the ‘development poles’ programme intended to 
reintegrate former Contra fighters in rural areas. In Liberia, funding for reintegration was 
seen as so inadequate that the International Crisis Group was compelled to call on the 
international community to: ‘Provide as a matter of urgency funds to finance the reintegration 
of Liberia’s ex-combatants.’91 
 
The absence of full financial support for reintegration activities has resulted in long and 
destabilising delays in progressing from demobilisation to reintegration phases, generating 
ex-combatant frustration that has in turn undercut the assumed security-building benefits of 
DDR. In Liberia, a full two years after the D and D stages had been completed, 40,000 
registered ex-combatants had not been given access to reintegration programmes, 92 while in 
Sierra Leone: ‘Many ex-combatants envisaged their allowances being paid instantly, but it 
was not uncommon for them to experience delays in payments of between three to seven 
months, causing widespread discontent and on occasion riots and violence.’93  In Central 
America, Spencer noted that: ‘The increased violence, banditry and use of arms in these 
countries is often a sign of former ex-combatants frustrated at their inability to reintegrate and 
angered at their governments for not providing adequate assistance. This frustration, coupled 
with high poverty, has led to increased violence on the streets, at times, worse than during the 
wars.’94 In Namibia, the failure of the newly independent government to devise an effective 
reintegration programme led ex-combatants to resort to public disruption and rioting, 95  
similarly in South Africa, where protests by ex-combatants were: ‘motivated by the needs of 
the individuals concerned to highlight their grievance.’ 96 In Bosnia Herzegovina: ‘Ex-
combatants felt abandoned by government institutions, as exemplified in frequency of 
peaceful protests and roadblocks in 1997 and 1998. Demobilized soldiers continue to 
confront government over pension delays, exclusion from the privatization process and 
grievances over housing.’97 This calls into question the assumed link between reintegration 
and security. It would appear to be the case that inappropriate training for non-existing 
employment opportunities, artificially inflated expectations of material advancement and 
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frustration with political and economic marginalisation that is responsible for fermenting 
discontent, rather than a proclivity toward violence on the part of ex-combatants. 98     
 
Although DDR is entering a ‘new phase’, there is little indication that donors have the 
capacity or willingness to step up reintegration funding to the substantial levels required to 
make these programmes effective or sustainable. More problematically, and as discussed in 
section 5, the trend of centralising post-conflict recovery and financing through multilateral 
basket funds is leading to a tying of reintegration assistance with economic conditionalities. 
In addition there has been little progress in reforming and restructuring funding mechanisms 
and financing streams. The issue of balancing distribution of funding between different 
elements of the DDR process has not been addressed by donors and a wider debate, relating 
to the reform of official development assistance (ODA) that would allow for donor funding of 
the military components of DDR has not gained traction.99     
 
4.3 Security 
A final limitation to effective and sustainable reintegration is the finding from the country 
case studies that disarmament programmes have serious limitations, that there is a lack of 
integration between the DD and the R stages, and a failure to adequately connect 
reintegration to broader security-related programming activities such as SSR and SALW (See 
Working papers 2 and 3 in this series). For example, in relation to disarmament, an estimated 
one weapon is turned in per two combatants in DDR programmes. 100  The El Salvador 
weapons collection programme left an estimated 200-300,000 weapons in civilian hands,101 
in Kosovo there were an estimated 317,000 illegally held SALW five years after formal 
disarmament, 102  in Mozambique only a ‘modest’ amount of the estimated six million 
weapons in the country were turned in,103  while in South Africa disarmament is widely 
acknowledged to have been incomplete.104 
 
Sustained insecurity is a reported problem in all of the case studies (in some contexts 
worsening) with violence acquiring new forms (violence against women, drug- and gun-
related violence). In Bosnia, where crime levels rose by 30 per cent between 2004 and 2005: 
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‘Surveys indicate that gender-based violence – including rape, domestic violence and 
trafficking – is a huge problem.’105 In South Africa, SALW: ‘feature prominently in violent 
crime and contribute directly to the distinctively high murder rate.’ 106 The EU Experts 
seminar noted that: ‘A massive rise in rape and violence mainly against women and young 
girls, but also involving men and boys, is often a particularly striking part of this trend.’ This 
was seen to be: ‘a direct consequence of years of war and violence and the consequent 
decline in moral and social values’, pointing to serious limitations in DDR as a ‘standalone’ 
process. In the majority of cases, the security gap and delays between DD and R stages 
allowed criminal groups to consolidate; led to the re-arming of frustrated ex-combatants and / 
or catalysed the formation of paramilitary groups defending minority ethnic or political 
interests.  This has repeatedly undermined the intended security building benefits of D and D, 
and the capacity of DDR programmes to create a foundation for long-term development and 
stability. 
 
Communities are particularly ill-positioned to articulate their security needs in the early phase 
of the conflict to peace transition and this is inadequately recognised in best practice 
guidelines which reify stakeholder participation without adequately engaging with the dire 
vulnerability and trauma of affected populations and the lack of infrastructure (police stations, 
communications equipment) and security in the immediate post-conflict phase.    
 
4.4 Programme Design 
Comprehensive best practice recommendations for reintegration programme design have 
repeatedly fallen down at the first hurdle – anticipating and calculating ex-combatant 
numbers. In Liberia, the number of ex-combatants registering for reinsertion and 
reintegration was triple original assessments. In Ivory Coast, ex-combatant numbers 
increased from 30,000 to more than 45,000 in a matter of months and in Kosovo 25,723 
Kosovo Liberation Army Fighters registered for DDR programmes, beyond the official 
estimate of 20,000. 107  Even in the most current DDR planning experience – Southern 
Sudan 108 – under-estimating ex-combatant numbers has been a problem, raising serious 
questions as to the capacity of programmers and agencies to absorb ‘lessons learned’ from 
previous experiences, anticipate over-subscription and address the drivers of exaggerated ex-
combatant numbers (such as access to reinsertion benefits.)  
 
The needs of women and vulnerable groups – such as disabled ex-combatants and child 
soldiers may be emphasised in best-practice guidelines, but in terms of practical experience, 
they are inadequately catered for in reintegration processes. In Sierra Leone for example, 
Solomon and Ginifer found that:  
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Women were among the worst affected by fault-lines in the design and 
implementation of DDR in terms of both their safety and security and economic/social 
recovery. The number of women associated with the fighting forces was estimated to 
be around 12 per cent. However, gender programming aimed at women was largely 
absent in DDR and there was little recognition of the formidable challenges faced by 
women ex-combatants.”109  
 
They conclude that: ‘By not making special provision for these women, DDR programmes 
missed an opportunity to intervene to reduce negative social and economic impacts on their 
well-being’ in turn having consequences for long-term development and poverty reduction 
strategies.  
  
Parallel problems were reported in the East Timor, Liberia, Central American, Nepal and 
regional West African programmes.110 Where targeted interventions for these constituencies 
were built into reintegration programmes, they were small scale, vulnerable to funding 
shortfalls and ultimately unsustainable. Existing programmes have failed to adequately 
respond to best practice guidelines, with substantive problems in relation to donor and NGO 
co-ordination, funding and sensitisation reported particularly in relation to the delivery of 
educational support and reintegration for child ex-combatants. More problematically, and again 
pointing to the empiricism of the assumptions underpinning reintegration programme design, the 
extent to which the reintegration needs and experience of female ex-combatants should be 
differentiated has been questioned in some country contexts. For example surveys in Sierra Leone and 
Eritrea finding limited distinction between male and female ex-combatant needs.111  
 
The cultural, economic and political challenges implicit in mainstreaming gender equality 
appears to be chronically underestimated in reintegration guidelines. For example, the reality 
of the post-conflict economic environment is inadequately factored into recommendations for 
the reintegration of women. While it is acknowledged that the provision of child-care 
facilities and home-based delivery of reintegration programmes is a means of addressing 
women’s needs,112 the capacity of the state or donors to deliver this type of assistance on a 
national, long-term and sustainable basis is limited and faces severe macro-economic 
constraints.  
 
Further to this, the desk and literature reviews demonstrate that programming inadequately 
addresses the recurrent marginalisation of women in the conflict to peace transition and there 
is little evidence of engagement with UNSCR 1325 113 in best practice guidelines or 
                                                 
109 UNAMSIL, ‘The DDR Process in Sierra Leone: Lessons Learned’, UNAMSIL DDR Co-ordination Section: 
Freetown, August 2003, p. 25. 
110 See the mini case studies and desk studies in the CICS DDR project.  
111 E. Bruchhaus and A. Mehreteab, ‘Leaving the warm house: the impact of demobilisation in Eritrea’ in K 
Kingma, (Ed.). ibid.  
112 See for example OECD (2006) Promoting Pro-Poor Growth: Private Sector Development. Ibid.  
113 SCR 1325 builds on earlier conflict and gender related resolutions that include the Convention of the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW 1979), the Beijing Declaration and 
Platform for Action (1995), the ECOSOC Agreement on Gender Mainstreaming (1997) and resolutions relating 
to the rights and protection of refugees, children and civilians in conflict, and the Geneva Conventions. On the 
28 
 
programming tools (CCA, UNDAF, PSRP, Needs Assessments etc). In its review of gender 
equality and aid delivery, but with relevance for the problems identified in reintegration, the 
OECD found that: ‘the gap between policy and implementation continues to be an uphill 
climb’, with shortfalls in funding for gender mainstreaming, gender policy specialists and 
training facilities particularly acute. 114   
 
Following from this, it should also be noted that the social and political dimensions of 
reintegration are inadequately addressed in the best practice literature beyond issues of 
community sensitization and social reintegration opportunities presented by community 
based approaches. The focus of programme design and best practice guidelines is specifically 
on the economic aspects of reintegration, with little consideration of political elements. This 
is despite the acknowledged importance of effective political reintegration for peacebuilding 
and prospects for long term stability. As Peake outlines in relation to East Timor: 
 
Timor is far from alone as a case of a state in which veterans form the first political 
elite in a new state or in radically altered constitutional arrangements. In the last 
decade, former combatants in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia and Northern 
Ireland, have adapted to new roles as politicians and administrators […] This dynamic 
is too often skirted over altogether in the DDR literature and programme advice.115  
 
The documentation does not engage with the political aspirations of ex-combatants or how 
other areas of programming – particularly democracy and governance related activities that 
form part of the long-term development / state building agenda can connect to reintegration.  
 
4.5 Training 
While best practice models emphasise well-designed training and reintegration programmes 
based on detailed evaluations of ex-combatant and community needs, this has only weakly 
translated into practice on the ground. In Liberia, ex-combatants in Monrovia claimed they 
were only offered agricultural training, even though they intended to stay in an urban area. In 
Sierra Leone, Ginifer and Solomon found that: ‘DDR failed to develop effective transitional 
livelihood options for ex-combatants and has contributed to their current poor economic 
prospects’ according to Ginifer and Solomon. They noted a lack of qualified and motivated 
teachers and trainers, particularly in the worst conflict affected regions of the country:  
 
This was compounded by the short-term six month training period which gave little 
prospect of providing credible skills and professional development […] interviews 
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show that training undertaken under DDR has not usually significantly contributed to 
ex-combatants’ well being.116 
 
Parallel problems were reported in all of the field and country-desk studies. In particular: 
training programmes were inadequately rolled out to the most intensely conflict affected 
regions or communities; there was a dearth of adequately trained trainers and teachers; 
funding shortfalls in training programmes were systemic and, once again, a common finding 
was that women in particular were inadequately catered for.    
 
The utility of the menu of training programmes set out in best practice recommendations is 
questionable, underscoring a serious disconnect across the CAS, UNDAF, Needs Assessment 
and PRSP process and there is an ongoing failure to engage with the socio-economic 
dislocation and economic realities of the post-conflict economies into which ex-combatants 
are expected to be reintegrated into. In the country case studies reviewed here (based on the 
desk studies and field studies), unemployment was on average over 60 per cent in the formal 
economy; credit and loans facilities were weak; private sector-based employment 
opportunities low and markets for ex-combatant skills and products were negligible. Across a 
range of country and regional contexts, from the Balkans and sub-Saharan Africa to South 
West and South East Asia, reintegration based training schemes led to limited formal 
employment opportunities and small and medium businesses supported by donors as part of 
the reintegration framework demonstrated limited sustainability. 117 While reinsertion and 
reintegration support aims to improve income earning / livelihoods opportunities, this has not 
been the experience in the majority of cases. While land distribution programmes and the 
support of family members did emerge as an important factor in the subsequent development 
of sustainable livelihoods, overall, economic reintegration programmes have not led to the 
enhancement of the economic position of ex-combatants, or in broader programming – their 
dependents. 118 In his survey of Liberian ex-combatants, Pugel did find a distinction in 
economic reintegration between those who had gone through reintegration training 
programmes and those that had not. However, the livelihoods and wage differentials were 
relatively narrow.119     
 
A serious criticism is that reintegration training is inadequately connected to national 
development plans and that programmes are informed only by the short-term need to 
‘securitize’ the post conflict environment by providing immediate opportunities for otherwise 
idle ex-combatants. Here there is a disjuncture between needs assessment exercises such as 
the CCA, UNDAF and PCNA. Related to this, data collection processes that underpin and 
                                                 
116 Ginifer and Solomon, Sierra Leone Country Case Study, CICS DDR Project. 
117 N. Ball (1997) ‘Demobilizing and Reintegrating Soldiers: Lessons from Africa in Kumar, K. (ed.) ibid.  
118 M. Humphreys and J. Weinstein (2007) ‘Demobilization and Reintegration’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
vol. 51, no. 4:  G. Lamb (2006) ‘South Africa: Reintegration into Civilian Life of Ex-Combatants’, Centre for 
Conflict Resolution, University of Cape Town, South Africa.  
http://www.nai.uu.se/publications/news/archives/033lamb/ 
119 J. Pugel (2006) ‘Key Findings from the Nation Wide Survey of Ex-combatants in Liberia: Reintegration and 
Reconciliation’  
http://mirror.undp.org/liberia_new/Ex-combatants%20Nationwide%20Survey%20-%20Key%20Findings.pdf 
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inform reintegration programmes, for example which ask ex-combatants to identify their 
preferred training / employment option, creates exaggerated expectations of long-term 
benefits. A further criticism is that these assessments are conducted during a time (the 
immediate post-conflict period) of economic transition and restructuring, which is to say a 
period when it is difficult to clearly discern what the future labour market will look like. 
Finally, a problem repeatedly identified in the literature and field reports is the challenge of 
absorbing the  ‘flood’ of ex-combatants, many of whom have shared the same package of 
reintegration training and consequently find themselves in competition with each other 
(mechanics, carpenters and barbers). The macroeconomic policies prescribed by donors to 
post-conflict countries (increasingly ‘imposed’ through conditionalities and debt relief 
packages) do not present the optimal environment for sustainable reintegration and the 
generation of productive livelihoods. In this respect, the economic constraints implicit in 
post-conflict environment are a serious limitation to the operationalisation of best-practice 
reintegration strategies and the capacity of institutions and programmers to forge connections 
between reintegration and long-term development strategies. 
 
This in turn explains why reintegration programmes have been relatively unsuccessful in 
promoting the dissolution of factional networks. Case studies from South Africa, Sierra 
Leone, East Timor, the Balkans, Central America, Mozambique, Eritrea, Angola and Liberia 
show that factional networks persisted long after termination of the formal DD and 
reintegration process. The percentage of ex-combatants maintaining these ties varied from 
country to country, up to 53% in South Africa,120 but in none of the case studies fell below 10% 
of the sample interviewed. These ties were seen by ex-combatants to provide opportunities 
for employment, information sharing, joint business initiatives, socialisation and personal 
security – the latter important when receiving communities and / or family members had 
rejected the ex-combatant. As such, the persistence of these networks emerged in this 
research as rationale, functional and vital to the welfare of the ex-combatant – a manifestly 
different impression than that provided in the DDR best-practice guidelines. 
 
5. Reintegration and Long Term Development: Contradictory Agendas 
In the previous section, a dichotomy between policy and practice in reintegration programme 
was shown. It was argued that weaknesses in DDR as a standalone area impede the forging of 
connections to long-term development planning. Similarly there are serious technical and 
policy impediments to linkage presented from the long-term development angle. Although 
development agencies and donors have made substantial progress in orienting their work to 
the specific challenges presented by post-conflict country contexts, serious technical, 
programming and institutional limitations exist, raising serious questions as to the capacity of 
development and lending institutions to link programmes and policies to reintegration 
activities. A broader critique, which is addressed in the second part of this section, relates to 
the impact of market oriented economic stabilization agendas that are pursued in post-conflict 
countries. These create a highly unfavourable macroeconomic and social environment for 
effective and sustainable reintegration activities.  
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5.1 Technical Challenges 
5.1.1 Mainstreaming Conflict Sensitivity 
Although the documentation produced by multilateral institutions and individual country 
donors elaborates on the need for a more nuanced approach to poverty reduction and conflict 
contexts, the documentation relating to pro-poor growth produced by the main international 
and donor agencies (including OECD DAC and the World Bank) make limited reference to 
conflict contexts. This is despite the dominance of the conflict / poverty paradigm and the 
fact that 22 of the 34 countries least likely to achieve the Millennium Development Goals are 
countries in, or emerging from, conflict. Here, the criticism is that the new development 
agenda lacks conflict sensitivity in the main best practice and generic poverty reduction (and 
pro-poor growth) documentation. The use of, and reference to conflict assessments and PCIA 
is negligible. There is limited acknowledgement of the potentially negative and harmful 
effects of best practice recommendations (for example, in relation to trade promotion, 
privatisation, FDI capture) in post-conflict and conflict prone country contexts, so while the 
literature is replete with emphasis on shifting away from ‘pure growth’ models to addressing 
patterns of growth and their distributionary impacts, 121  there is no consideration of the 
potential conflict inducing impacts of these policies. There is limited integration of post-
conflict reconstruction issues or assessment of the relationship between frameworks for 
recovery (such as the PCNA and CAS) and best practice development guidelines. The DAC 
and its Network on Poverty Reduction (POVNET), which aims to develop and share good 
practice, do not make any connection between conflict, transitionary assistance and long term 
development and there is no acknowledgement of sequencing issues. The political and 
economic dynamics of conflict prone countries are bypassed and treated as neutral variables 
that have no impact on best practice and optimal development strategy. In this anti-poverty 
framework, absolutely no reference is made to DDR processes. Moreover tools for enhancing 
conflict sensitivity and for conducting conflict impact assessments are underused and under-
stressed in the documentation, wherein a primacy is placed on poverty and its determinants, 
while insignificant attention is paid to the conflict elements.  
 
This absence of conflict sensitivity and the lack of progress in institutionalising the use of 
conflict assessment tools and frameworks underscores the limited progress that has been 
made in mainstreaming conflict dynamics across the spectrum of development organisations. 
This reflects the limited influence of ‘relief to development’ thinking across development 
agencies and signposts the scale of the challenge ahead if more effective connections are to 
be made between DDR and long term development strategies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
121 OECD DAC (2001) DAC Guidelines on Poverty Reduction, ibid. OECD DAC (2006) Promoting Pro-Poor 
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Box 9: Documentary Weaknesses (1) 
 
Conflict in Development: The Missing Link
OECD 2006, Promoting Pro-Poor Growth: Key Policy messages (and also OECD, Integrating 
Human Rights into Development: Donor Approaches, Experiences and Challenges, OECD The 
Development Dimension Series, Paris 2006). 
  
• While detailing the importance of infrastructure improvements, access to land and 
agriculture, market opportunities, investment in early childhood development and the 
importance of gains in social development for sustainable and pro-poor growth, this 
important and influential document makes no reference to conflict-affected countries or 
conflict settings.  
• There is no acknowledgement of the post-conflict context that pertains to many poor 
countries.  
• Failed and fragile states are barely touched upon.  
• The importance of improving security for pro-poor growth is stressed, with Sierra Leone and 
Rwanda cited as case studies – but despite the use of these post-conflict examples, there is no 
discussion of justice and security issues during the DDR phase. The entire DDR process is 
sidelined in this document, which provides no pointers for linkages between DDR and long-
term development strategy. This document is highly conflict insensitive, with no integration 
of conflict risk or assessment for the policy recommendations presented 
 
OECD/ DAC 2007 Action Oriented Policy Paper on Human Rights and Development 
• Detailed in its elaboration of opportunities for integrating human rights principles, promoting 
human rights more effectively in development, and mainstreaming human rights as a cross-
cutting issue in development assistance, this document makes no reference to conflict 
contexts – even in its assessment of fragile states.  
• No linkage is discussed or foreseen between transitional justice and longer term access to 
justice initiatives and / or potentially negative and discriminatory impacts from programming 
in the DDR phase. 
 
 
Indicative of the neglect of the conflict dimension in current development strategy, the best 
practice documentation on poverty reduction bypasses the dilemmas implicit in transiting war 
economies, and neglects the political economy of post-conflict economies (economic / power 
alignments, resource distribution, employment structures, infrastructure deficits). 122  
Transiting conflict-affected economies is addressed as a technical matter, an issue of putting 
the right institutions and policies into place and encouraging formalisation of economic sub-
sectors. The failure to develop assessments of war economies and their characteristics and 
impacts on the post-conflict setting is a significant omission. Development throughout the 
‘relief to development’ continuum is affected by economic structures, opportunities and 
interests forged and institutionalised during the conflict. The size and depth of the war 
economy inevitably differs in individual country settings, but invariably in all cases it: 
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a) Structures economic and political incentives in the immediate post-conflict period – i.e. 
whether to persist on the outside of formal structures and sustain illegal economic 
activities or to forego illicit opportunity for formality and legitimacy; 
b) Shapes the employment opportunities and cost assessments of actors (specifically ex-
combatants); 
c) Determines the economic ‘space’ open to government and the private sector and the 
potential costs (conflict related) of confronting illicit activities; 
d) Crafts shadow networks of influence that usually permeate local administration if not 
national government; 
e) Distorts transition economies and transition agendas. For example, a noted feature of 
the privatisation process in a number of conflict-affected countries has been the 
purchase of liberalised sectors by ‘criminal’ elements with wealth derived from illicit 
activities (Kosovo); 
f) Undermines effective macroeconomic management.     
 
War economies remain a significantly under-researched area, despite recent evidence that 
they become progressively more embedded with the application of market led stabilisation 
processes that restrict opportunities for employment in the formal sector, access to welfare 
and related publicly funded benefits and which negatively impact on small scale livelihoods. 
Further reflecting the detachment of best practice development guidelines from the realities 
on the ground in conflict afflicted countries, the politically demobilising and socially 
polarising effects of conflict are not factored into guidelines on stakeholder participation and 
community dialogue, which inform both the DDR literature and the pro-poor literature of the 
development agencies.    
 
5.1.2 Needs Assessments 
While the needs assessment processes present a mechanism for linking reintegration and long 
term development, there are serious technical deficiencies that must be addressed before 
these can become effective and useful tools. As GTZ, among other critics have highlighted: 
‘their process and methodology have not yet been systematically assessed and further 
developed, causing concern at the main agencies responsible for their main implementation’. 
Moreover: ‘understanding of the underlying principles and methodologies is quite often 
widely divergent’ and in all of the PCNAs analysed by GTZ none had established a clear 
conceptual link between peace-building and the issues addressed in the needs assessment. 
Running against the emphasis on coordination and cohesion between agencies, interaction 
and planning has been criticised as deficient, and low standards of quality in assessment 
preparations, monitoring and evaluation have been highlighted.123 A particular deficiency, 
and one which highlights the opportunities lost for bridging reintegration and long-term 
development relates to issues of national ownership and stakeholder participation. Both the 
Needs Assessment and PRSP exercises have been criticised for failing to build effective 
national ownership, with tensions between national development priorities and conditionality 
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terms (resulting in limited country manoeuvrability in defining the anti-poverty agenda) 
highlighted. Inter-related with this, rather than engaging widely and broadly with community, 
regional and national domestic stakeholders, both exercises are criticised as donor driven, 
offering little opportunity for effective local input.124 
 
Box 10: Documentary Weaknesses (2) 
 
UNDG Practical Guide to Multilateral Needs Assessments in Post-Conflict Situations (2004) 
• This document discusses ‘the context in which post-conflict needs assessments take place, its 
links with the post-conflict recovery phase, and a broad typology of post-conflict settings that 
influence the approach to the needs assessment’  and ‘reviews some key conceptual issues, 
including the need to embed the process within a longer-term vision on reconstruction, linkages 
to other processes, the selection of priority sectors, approaches to costing needs, integration of 
cross-cutting issues such as gender and environment, and the need to focus on institutional 
capacity building. The guide includes recommendations on managing the needs assessment 
process, from the preparatory phase to the lessons-learned phase.’  
• While expansive in its elaboration of the above areas, there is no discussion of DDR processes 
and their relationship to longer term development. No programmatic or conceptual linkages 
between DDR and LTDS are identified or elaborated. This is despite the document’s aim of 
bridging the relief to development gap. 
 
World Bank The Role of the World Bank in Conflict and Development: An Evolving Agenda 
and Development Cooperation and Conflict (2001) 
• As with the UNDG document, these two World Bank documents outline the need to link 
transformative and long term development in post conflict reconstruction and they set out 
frameworks and tools for conflict assessment and sensitivity in procedural operations. 
• Detail is provided of the emerging importance of DDR activities to the World Bank and for 
unified post-conflict reconstruction agencies. However, no linkage is made between DDR 
processes and programming and long-term development.  
 
 
The stress on stakeholder participation and routinised dialogue is not followed through by 
donor and government practice on the ground. The majority of the population are excluded 
from major policy decisions that shape national economic policy. The stakeholder rhetoric 
does not address the structural limitations on participation by poor people – a heterogeneous 
sector with distinct needs and engagement capacities. In particular, there has been little 
progress in institutionalising the role of community organisations, linking community based 
reintegration and community led development processes or strengthening the legal position of 
communities within the policy and legal framework.  
 
5.1.3 Aid Harmonisation    
A 2006 monitoring of the 2005 Paris Declaration found that: ‘half of the developing countries 
signing onto the Paris Declaration, partners and donors have a long road ahead to meet the 
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commitments they have undertaken.’ 125 Aid flows remained volatile and unpredictable, 
undermining improvements to, and accuracy in budgeting procedures. Only 17% of the 
countries reviewed had a robust development framework with the necessary capacity and 
resources for implementation. Inter-related with this, revised PSRPs were found to be: a) 
ineffective in terms of prioritisation and sequencing; b) lacking in mechanisms to ensure 
prioritised actions had resources and; c) vulnerable to problems of operationalisation at 
different tiers of government.126  
 
The cost of uncoordinated aid continued to be high and slow progress was reported in untying 
aid, prompting the monitoring report to emphasise an urgent need for donors to: ‘work more 
aggressively to ensure reduced costs and harmonisation.’ Despite a commitment to joint 
missions and assessments, the report noted a continued proliferation of parallel 
implementation units (PIUs)  and limited progress by donors in meeting  the target of 611 
PIUs by 2010 (down from the 1832 recorded in 2006).  
 
Good headquarter policies were not being translated on the ground in country, and country 
ownership – a core principle of the Declaration- was found to be weak and in need of 
strengthening. The report also found that more work needed to be done on managing results 
and developing systems for mutual accountability and performance assessment. Joint 
exercises, such as the Country Financial Accountability Assessment (CFAA) and Public 
Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) assessment were being conducted, but 
progress here was undermined by delays in the dispersal of aid that in turn exacerbated 
problems of under- and over-accounting in budgets.   
 
5.1.4 Aid Dispersal 
Aid continued to be concentrated among a small group of recipients. UNCTAD found that 
the share of the ten largest African aid recipients increased from 35% between 1985-94 to 40% 
between 1995-2004. Overlapping with this was a concentration of FDI receipts, with the top 
ten African destinations receiving 75 per cent of FDI.127 In line with the Paris Aid review, 
UNCTAD found that ODA continued to be volatile, heavily concentrated and driven by 
priorities distinct from the development agenda (specifically the geopolitical, strategic and 
security considerations of donors). Aid delivery has also become increasingly focused on 
social services (education, health and welfare concerns), in line with the objectives set out in 
the Millennium Development Goals. Critics, which include Finance Ministers from Africa 
and the UNCTAD, claim this is at the cost of broader economic and development objectives 
and neglect of the underlying structural causes of poverty (infrastructure, agricultural 
development and energy supply). A specific concern is that this expenditure cannot be 
sustained in the absence of growth-oriented, productive investment. An estimated 65% of 
resources released under the HIPC initiative focused on social services, while only 7% were 
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dedicated to infrastructure (4% on governance and 1% on structural reforms).128 The trend of 
donors supporting specific projects through the Sector Wide Approaches was found to be 
poorly co-ordinated in relation to each individual project and also national development 
goals. 129  Finally, sectoral distribution of aid continued to be heavily determined by the 
priorities and preferences of donors, not recipient countries130 and this in turn lead to the 
neglect of new, emerging development challenges such as the rapid expansion of urban 
populations; 
 
5.1.5 Aid Levels 
Central to the development agenda of the 2000s has been the concept of the ‘Big Push’ to 
drive the poorest countries of the world forward. This has informed debt relief initiatives and 
donor commitments to increase aid levels. It is estimated that $50 billion to $76 billion pa is 
required for all developing countries to reach the MDGs, while in Africa, the necessary 
additional resources are estimated to total 10-20% of GDP.131 However, donors are not on 
course to meet commitments to a scaling up of ODA to 0.7% of GDP and grants available to 
poor countries. Linked with this, the WTO has made limited progress in expanding the trade 
and market opportunities to developing countries or in eliminating developed world subsidies 
to domestic producers and exporters. 
 
5.1.6  Financial Support to Conflict-Affected Countries 
Beyond the generic problems relating to revised donor engagement strategies and principles 
in developing countries, there are also ongoing dilemmas related to best practice in fragile 
and conflict prone states. This is despite efforts to refine strategic approaches and enhance the 
conflict sensitivity and operational sophistication of actors and agencies that are engaged in 
post-conflict settings.  
 
Fragile states remain highly dependent on a limited number of donors, and aid flows remain 
volatile. 132 In its 2005 assessment, the Development Assistance Committee Monitoring 
Resources Flows to Fragile States found that Cote D’Ivoire, Zimbabwe, Liberia, Burundi, 
Niger, Central African Republic, Sierra Leone, Chad, Tajikistan, Guinea-Bissau and Togo 
either received low levels of aid in relation to need and governance indicators or they 
experienced high volatility of aid flows and international engagement. These countries: 
‘appear to attract relatively little international attention and, to that extent, could be regarded 
as marginalised.’ The 2006 report 133 pointed to ongoing problems in countries that were 
‘marginalised’ and receiving already low levels of aid in relation to their relatively higher 
needs and policy and institutional quality (Burundi, DRC, Guinea, Nigeria, Uzbekistan, 
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Yemen, Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Myanmar, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, 
Zimbabwe). The Fragile States Group found that country-level frameworks for sharing 
information among donors were insufficient to coordinate the allocation of aid in fragile 
states and that improvement was needed in the communicating and sharing of information on 
aid allocation intentions.  
 
Despite best practice guidelines and engagement principles stressing the need to maintain 
support to post-conflict countries, there is an ongoing problem of donor’s rescinding financial 
assistance once the immediate conflict period has passed.134 The 2005 Monitoring Resource 
Flows to Fragile States found that post conflict Sierra Leone: ‘might be an example of where 
donors may be withdrawing too early in the post conflict phase’, while the Central Africa 
Republic ‘might be an example of where donors have turned their back on a country’. The 
IMF and World Bank found that there has been continuity in the pattern of aid being 
abundant and extraordinarily high when a country is at the centre of international attention, 
declining thereafter as attention fades.135 
 
On a political level, regional organisations, IFIs and donors have institutionalised the 
principle of maintaining engagement. This is intended to counter the marginalisation and 
isolation of pariah regimes and citizens within its borders. It marks an important shift from 
the practice of sanctioning and embargoing that frequently exacerbated social crisis and 
entrenched pariah governments. However, there is a long way to go before all external actors 
operate and practice this principle with the requisite unity for it to be translated into a 
coherent policy. Realpolitik and strategic interests continue to prevent declaratory statements 
effecting actual practice on the ground. Further to this, there is an ongoing problem with 
judging the standards of fragile, pariah and conflict prone states and the applicability of 
conditionality as a basis for financial support in these contexts. There is a real danger that 
continuity with the system of ‘rewarding’ good performers, as represented by the operating 
principles of the US Millennium Challenge Account, will perpetuate volatility of aid flows 
and contradict the thrust of the engagement strategy.     
 
5.2 Development Policy 
There is a substantial critique as to the appropriateness of current growth and development 
paradigms and the assumptions relating to peacebuilding, civil society, the capacity of the 
private sector and the role of development aid that underpin them. Here, donor led economic 
and political reconstruction strategies that form the ‘state building agenda’ amount to a: ‘level 
of intrusion and social engineering that would not have been countenanced by earlier 
generations of aid donors’.136 For some critics, the package of pro-poor development, good 
governance and democratic assistance constitutes a: ‘highly invasive forms of external 
regulation’ 137 that is ‘neo-colonial’ in its core characteristics of perpetuating external 
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dependence, inhibiting local ownership and responding to the interests of outside actors. 
Rather than building effective states, these forms of liberal peacebuilding and intervention 
structure weak and illegitimate states and perpetuate conflict and drivers of conflict such as 
inequality and unrepresentative government.138  
 
A core criticism of the standard package of stabilization and structural adjustment packages 
that were imposed in the 1980s and 1990s was that they fundamentally failed to produce the 
‘right kind of growth path’. 139 The ‘post-Washington Consensus’ approaches mark little 
more than a tinkering at the edges of existing practice. Standardised packages based on 
reducing public expenditures, privatising state industries and reducing tariffs seriously erode 
the capacity of post-conflict states to generate employment, and they forge an environment 
that counters the success of reintegration packages that are premised on developing 
productive livelihoods, small scale co-operatives and ‘decent work’.  
 
Policies promoting market liberalisation, free trade based regional integration and ‘global 
insertion’ have not generated the national growth benefits intended or assumed due to a 
number of factors that include: changing patterns of consumer demand away from ‘traditional’ 
commodities140 to new ‘dynamic’ products; an expansion of the trade in higher-value-added 
agricultural commodities; growing commercial domination by large, vertically integrated 
firms and a strengthening of the technological component of production, distribution, 
information and marketing chains. This changing dynamics of the global economy poses 
tremendous challenges for post-conflict countries,141 which are ill-positioned to capitalise on 
‘new’ dynamic export sectors and markets – at least during the critical short- to medium term 
owing to factors that include climatic, infrastructure, social capital, investment and 
geographic deficits. Where post-conflict countries have been able to respond flexibly and 
identify the right mix of markets, skills and output (for example, cut flowers and agricultural 
products from Central American countries), the new export sector has generated poorly 
remunerated employment opportunities. This in turn has deepened problems of poverty and 
inequality, while increasing reliance on the informal economy for livelihoods and security. In 
the Central American case (although with parallels in other post-conflict contexts such as the 
Balkans) this structural conditions have allowed the illicit, war economy to become 
embedded in the post-conflict system as a function of its importance and economic vitality.    
 
In this respect, development strategies continue to give limited acknowledgement to the 
actual operating reality – and structural constraints - on the ground in conflict affected 
countries. Units such as the PCRU do nod to the difficult social, economic and political post-
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conflict environment, but their policy recommendations continue to be informed by idealised 
notions of the private sector, civil society and government capacity. In the countries reviewed 
for this paper, the private sector was weak, fragmented on ethnic, religious or regional lines 
and fundamentally incapable of serving as the ‘motor of development’ posited in 
contemporary growth paradigms. In a number of cases – the Balkans being paradigmatic – 
the war economy elite was the only group positioned to participate in privatisation and 
private sector development processes. This led to money laundering and corruption on a 
grand scale, severely undermining prospects for long-term development and good governance. 
Civil society – as outlined in the previous section on DDR, tended to be traumatised, 
displaced and ill positioned to feed into ‘participatory’ processes’.  
 
The persistence of market oriented approaches in post-conflict countries delimits the potential 
for creating an economic peace dividend, it generates new forms of conflict and exclusion 
and constrains opportunities for sustainable reintegration. However, national governments in 
conflict affected countries are highly constrained in their ability to respond flexibly to their 
own, self defined development agendas and demands of national constituencies owing to the 
conditionality terms that flow from the post-conflict debt relief packages of donors and IFIs.    
Donors allow little room for the emergence of a ‘developmental state’ that is responsive to 
the interests of domestic citizens and capable of formulating indigenous development 
strategies and responses. Agendas and priorities continue to be set by external actors. The 
persistence of conditionality in lending modalities erodes the autonomy of national 
governments and the evolution of interest articulation and reconciliation capacities in the 
recipient country. Income generation (specifically the needs of particular communities) and 
labour market issues are neglected in the new development discourse, undermining human 
security and development gains while jeopardising transitions from organised political 
violence in conflict to criminal violence in peacetime.142  
 
In this context, meaningful reform and progress in reducing poverty and building legitimate, 
representative government can only come from far-reaching change to the structure and 
ideological orientation of multilateral organisations and international financial institutions, 
with an emphasis on building ‘developmental states’. The provision of more autonomy for 
developing countries in enacting their policy vision is seen as a fundamental, as is improved 
representation of poor countries in multilateral fora. More broadly, radical reform of the 
international trading systems and a scaling up of development assistance to poor countries (or 
at a minimum, a commitment on the part of developed countries to deliver on pre-existing 
ODA commitments) is posited as an appropriate macro-level response.  
 
Conclusion 
While opportunities and mechanisms exist for linking reintegration to long-term development, 
these are inadequately elucidated and show limited institutionalisation and uptake by donors 
and practitioners. Tools such as the Needs Assessment and PRSP and development strategy 
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based on engaging the private sector in reconstruction, can bridge the reintegration to 
development continuum, but they have not been effectively utilised or deployed in order to 
achieve this objective. There is a substantial disconnect between policy and practice, with 
reintegration and long-term development processes and programs demonstrating ongoing 
limitations as ‘stand-alone’ areas. Before complementarities and linkages can be developed, 
substantial effort must be dedicated to refining existing programmes, policies and approaches. 
Failure to follow and realise commitments in issue areas such as funding for reintegration, 
stakeholder participation, country ownership, aid harmonisation, conflict sensitive and 
realistically pro-poor development processes, will not only constrain the possibility of 
evolving linkages, it also runs the risk of ‘doing harm’ and institutionalising existing bad 
practice and policy and programming weaknesses. More fundamentally, there needs to be 
serious exploration of current programme strategies and empirical grounding for the 
assumptions that underpin them. For example, in relation to reintegration, Muggah has 
suggested that: ‘Despite growing enthusiasm for DDR within defence and development 
circles, there is a surprising lack of evidence as to whether or not it works. With the exception 
of a smattering of assessments, post-mortems and superficial indicators relating to the 
number of weapons collected and the number of ex-combatants demobilised, there is virtually 
no proof that such interventions strengthen ‘human security.’143 Moreover, there is evidence 
to suggest from Sierra Leone, Mozambique, Angola and South Africa that independent (non-
programmed) community and local processes as the driver of social reintegration, with the 
church, family and local political organisations in particular accounting for the success of 
otherwise of reintegration. These questions around the value of DDR need to be addressed 
before it is appropriate to develop linkages to long-term development processes that in 
themselves may contradict and undermine the goals of reintegration. Ultimately, limiting the 
scope of reintegration programmes to spoilers and a narrowly defined range of ex-combatants 
can divert attention away from structural impediments to broad-based and equitable national 
recovery and development.144  
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